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In 1947, the British colony of India was declared independent and emerged as two 
separate states, Pakistan and India. To examine this event, I ask what material cause(s) made 
possible the institutional separation between these two new states. To approach this question, I 
will review the process of political identity formation from the upheaval of 1857 to the 1947 
partition. In so doing, I argue that the system of categorizing those who were under British 
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Introduction   
In 1947, the British colony of India was declared independent and emerged as two 
separate states, Pakistan and India. To examine this event, I ask what material cause(s) made 
possible the institutional separation between these two new states. To approach this question, I 
will review the process of political identity formation from the upheaval of 1857 to the 1947 
partition. In so doing, I argue that the system of categorizing those who were under British 
colonial rule manufactured a particular set of political identities on the Indian subcontinent.  
I will explore the relationship between institutions and political identity formation under 
the British system of categorization. I will look at the manufacture of a static identity on the 
Indian subcontinent from identities that were previously more fluid. I argue that this led to the 
institutionalization of a homogenized and fixed identity that eventually resulted in the demand 
and implementation of separate electorates. These constructed political identities deepened 
divisions in India and made partition the most likely outcome as constituencies and politicians in 
India sought to maximize their electoral interests along the lines of their manufactured identities. 
A historical analysis will explore the formation of political identities and separate electorates that 
lead to the development of parallel political structures, the Muslim League and the Indian 
National Congress (INC) which path determined the formation of two states. The historical 
evidence will seek to explain how colonially manufactured political identities and separate 
electorates created the conditions that made possible the development of two parallel 
organizations that could not coexist in the framework of a unified state. The trajectory of politics 
will be identified through reforms and elections as seats at different administrative levels of 




actions of Indian Subjects, the INC, the Muslim League, and the British throughout the period 
following the upheaval of 1857, and leading up until the 1947 partition. 
There are several authors without whom this work would not be possible. They provide 
the intellectual framework to help us look deeper into these events and seek greater 
understanding. Of these authors the most influential are Edward Said, Partha Chatterjee, Ranajit 
Guha, and especially Mahmood Mamdani. Edward Said will help us understand the particular 
form of cultural imperialism, Chatterjee nationalism as it relates to political mobilization, Guha 
the social dynamics of power relations, and Mamdani the administrative strategies. This is not to 
say that these are exclusive cantons of thought as they overlap and inform each other, but these 
are their primary intellectual contributors to this work. After setting out more particularly these 
authors’ arguments they will be applied to detailed historical analysis. 
I will begin with a focus on the period of time before and after the events of 1857. This 
will provide the starting point for an exploration of the British Raj, as well as a brief analysis of 
the upheaval and its impact on administrative strategies, the Raj’s administrative choices, and 
Indian responses. 
 Next, I will explore the implementation of ruling strategies in several domains:  
education, law, society (association formation), and most starkly in the form of the census, as it 
literally names and communicates the ordering of identities ascribed by the British. In each of 
these domains the impact of administrative ruling strategies in the day-to-day life of the Indian 
subjects is demonstrated, revealing their effect, diverging society between a civilizing elite and 




 Following the exploration of ruling strategies, I will look at the formation of political 
associations, their consolidation at the all-Indian level, British involvement, and responses. This 
section more broadly sets up the origins of political movements and associations as well as the 
sectarian and British dialectics that shaped political developments, reviewing ideological debates 
in India and Britain. The interaction between Muslim and Hindu politicians will be traced from 
their initial cooperation and political identification primarily as Indian, to their formation of 
parallel organizations along the lines of a sharpening sectarian divide fostered by the British and 
collaborating religious officials.  
 Lastly, I will examine how the process of parallel political development becomes 
entrenched into electoral schemes. I will look at how separate electorates were granted and why.  
That exploration will reveal how these separate electorates were implemented and how that 
continued to shape political organization. The role of expanding suffrage will be examined 
throughout. Finally, I will look at the confluence of expanding suffrage, separate electorates, 
imperial administrative strategies and objectives, and the events on the path to state separation.  
 Plotting this trajectory from the upheaval of 1857, and the imposition of the British Raj, 
to the eventual division into two states is designed to try and find understanding as to what made 
this possible. This historical analysis will attempt to draw some conclusions about political 
identity formation and how identity is shaped by power. Through all of the political events, 
institutions and established behavioral patterns, through administrative strategies, and religious 
collaboration throughout the course of this century in Indian history, 1857-1947, political 
identities were shaped in the service of power. This is the story of how power shaped those 




Literature Review   
The way in which power, acting through institutions, shapes political identity formation 
has long been the crux of my thinking about praxis in politics. This is particularly evident in 
colonial states and their evolution towards ‘native’ rule. If identity, and the definition of that 
identity ascribed by power, is the conditioning agent of political and state formation the question 
becomes, how does power shape political identity formation? Since much of the world’s present 
governments stem from a colonial state, it is important to understand the process by which power 
manufactures identities. In the context of this project I will examine specifically how in colonial 
India political identities are shaped in the service of imperial objectives.  
To begin this endeavor it is essential to lay down the necessary concepts, and associated 
authors to gain the theoretical footing required in analyzing the political identities and formations 
that led to the physical division of India. To do so, I will briefly explore the works of four major 
influences, with whom I have found the most scholarly parallels to this hypothesis: Edward Said, 
Partha Chatterjee, Ranajit Guha, and Mahmood Mamdani 
Edward Said first outlined the modern notion of Orientalism, giving it its modern flavor 
as a pejorative. It has become synonymous with the imperial gaze, and the ascribed attributes to 
peoples and places by those outside of those peoples and places, the West or Occident. 
Orientalism today is used to denote the fetishization of the ‘other’ by societies in global positions 
of power and influence. The result of looking at the other from this imperial gaze is telling in,  
…the encyclopedic description of Orientalism roughly from 1765 to 1850 given by 
Raymond Schwab in his La Renaissance Orientale (1950). Quite aside from the scientific 
discoveries of things Orientale made by learned professionals during this period in 
Europe, there was in addition the virtual epidemic of Orientalia affecting every major 




an amateur or professional enthusiasm for everything Asiatic, which was wonderfully 
synonymous with the exotic, mysterious, profound, seminal…1 
 
For Said, the concept of Orientalism was a form of cultural imperialism. He demonstrated the 
exotic and homogenizing nature of imperial culture by conducting literary reviews from texts 
written under the influence of imperialism. During his analyses he points to a distinct concept of 
identity formation: negative identity. That is identity as a formation against the ‘other’ more 
powerful imperial identity. If the Orient is exotic and mysterious to the Occident center, the 
Occident or West is familiar and rational because it is the imperial ruler. There is something 
pernicious in the way the mind categorizes people as the ‘other.’ It is pernicious because the 
underlying presupposition is that of an unbalanced dyad. Said cites Strauss in his 
conceptualization of this problem, 
Despite the distraction of a great many vague desires, impulses, and images, the mind 
seems persistently to formulate what Levi-Strauss has called a logic of the concrete. A 
primitive tribe, for example, assigns a definite place, function and significance to every 
leafy species in its immediate environment; many of these herbs and flowers have no 
practical use, but the point Levi-Strauss makes is that the mind requires order, and order 
is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which 
the mind is aware in a secure, re-findable place, therefore giving things some role to play 
in the economy of objects and identities that make up an environment. This kind of 
rudimentary classification has a logic to it, but the rules of the logic by which a green fern 
in one society is a symbol of grace and in another is considered maleficent are neither 
predictably rational nor universal. There is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the 
way the distinctions between things are seen. And with these distinctions go values 
whose history, if one could unearth it completely, would probably show the same 
measure of arbitrariness. […] But if we agree that all things in history, like history itself, 
are made by men, then we will appreciate how possible it is for objects, or places, or 
times, to be assigned roles and given meanings that acquire objective validity only after 
the assignments are made. This is especially true of relatively uncommon things, like 
foreigners, mutants, or "abnormal" behavior. Obviously, some distinctive objects are 
made by the mind, and these objects, while appearing to exist objectively, have only a 
fictional reality. A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries 
                                                 




between their land and its immediate surroundings on the one hand, and on the other, a 
land beyond theirs which they call "the land of the barbarians." In other words, this 
universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an 
unfamiliar space beyond "ours," which is "theirs," is a way of making geographical 
distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary. I use the word arbitrary here because 
imaginative geography of the "our land / barbarian land" variety does not require that the 
barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in 
our own minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, and both their territory and their 
mentality is designated as different from "ours." To a certain extent modern and primitive 
societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively.2 
 
It is in this way that systems of categorization as governing practices based on those systems, 
imagine identities for those governed in the context of colonial administration. This kind of 
imagined self/center categorizing of the other is how colonial rule is carried out in the cultural 
sphere, whether conscious or unconscious in the minds of the administrators, collaborators, and 
individuals recording and creating knowledge. Said summarizes this neatly,  
To restore a region from its present classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) in 
the ways of the modern West; to subordinate underplay military intervention in order to 
aggrandize the project of acquiring priceless knowledge in the process of political 
domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition 
with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and  its 
“natural” role as an appendage of Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during 
colonial occupation with the title "contribution to modern learning" when the natives had 
neither been consulted nor treated as anything except pre-texts for a text, whose 
usefulness is not to the natives; to feel oneself, as a European, in command, almost at 
will, of Oriental history, time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to 
establish new disciplines; to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record 
everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a 
generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental 
nature, temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living 
reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because 
as a European nothing in the Orient seems to resist one's powers: these are the features of 
Orientalist projection fully realized…3 
 
                                                 
2 Said, “Orientalism”, 166-167 




It is in this way that British colonial administrators governed their Indian colony, making mass 
generalizations that put their subjects neatly into categories, and stripped them of their own 
agency, specifically by conceptualizing and defining identities suitable in the service of imperial 
objectives. To operate within the British Raj, Indians needed to present themselves to power 
under the terms of power, as a British imagined political category, defined by the British and 
serving their power.  
To move more closely to the subject at hand, and the logical extent of Said’s previous 
statement, we turn to the Subaltern Study Group, a body of post-colonial scholars studying the 
theoretical transition between colonial and native rule. Their view is that of the voiceless in the 
experience of colonial rule, to give agency back to Indian subjects. In this recounting, of the 
events leading up to the Indian partition, the role of the subaltern becomes of interest in the 
formation of nationalism as electorates are created and expand, making it necessary for elites to 
coopt masses and convince them of the primacy of their colonial defined political identity. One 
of the most prominent subaltern scholars, Ranajit Guha, sought to address the Indian historical 
disparity between the role of elites and the masses. To Guha and the subaltern scholars,  
Indian history, assimilated thereby to the history of Great Britain, would henceforth be 
used as a comprehensive measure of difference between the peoples of these two 
countries. Politically that difference was spelled out as one between rulers and the ruled; 
ethically, between a white Herrenvolk and blacks; materially, between a prosperous 
Western power and its poor Asian subjects; culturally, between higher and lower levels of 
civilization, between the superior religion of Christianity and indigenous belief systems 
made up of superstition and barbarism – all adding up to an irreconcilable difference 
between colonizer and colonized. The Indian past was thus painted red.4 
 
                                                 




They saw the history of India as produced under the dichotomy we have discussed with Said. 
Guha goes on to distinguish the liberal ideological unity of the elite (both British and Indian), 
“all transactions between the two parties which made up the stuff of elite politics followed from 
an understanding to abide by a common set of rules based on British constitutionalist 
parliamentary model. It was a matter of playing cricket. If a nationalist agitation ran into 
difficulty, the bureaucracy would gloat that Gandhi was on a poor wicket, and he would, on his 
part, condemn the administration as ‘un-British’ whenever he felt outraged by the harshness of 
official violence.”5 This is one of the aspects that are most critical to understanding the role of 
Indian elites in political formation. They were so extensively educated in British systems of 
knowledge, almost exclusively so, that they acted wholly inside of the paradigms set forth by the 
British.  
Another subaltern scholar, Partha Chatterjee, focused on nationalist thought as a liberal 
economic imperative – progress. For Chatterjee Indian actors did indeed operate within these 
confines, but this did not mean that they were devoid of agency. Chatterjee thought quite the 
opposite about the character of colonial nationalism,  
…nationalist thought in the colonised countries of Asia or Africa did not simply create a 
derivative discourse. At one level it challenged the colonial claim that the backward 
peoples were culturally incapable of ruling them-selves in the conditions of the modern 
world. It thus denied the alleged inferiority of the colonised people. At the same time, 
nationalism also asserted that a backward nation could 'modernise' itself while retaining 
its cultural identity, thus accepting at another level the values of 'modernity' and 'progress' 
as developed in the West. Nationalism thus produced a discourse in which, even as it 
challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual 
premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based.6 
                                                 
5 Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India, 4  






Again, for Chatterjee, like Guha, there is a sympathetic intellectual framework for the colonizer 
and Indian elite. These challenges to colonial rule were articulated by the formation of English 
style political associations and both acted within the frame work and challenged it. This was the 
dilemma of colonial administration and was resolved by the British by claiming that these elite 
were not representative. In order to undermine these initiatives and a unified nationalism from 
forming the British for their part institutionalized religious divisions in governing seats and 
electoral schema.  
Chatterjee correctly identifies the connection between historical realities, ideology, and 
social structures,  
It is at the level of the problematic that nationalist discourse makes certain claims 
regarding the historical possibilities which it thinks are feasible; it also makes claims 
regarding the practical forms through which those possibilities could be realised. 
Historical possibilities, practical realisation. The claims of the ideology are directly 
located on the terrain of politics, the field of contest for power, where its claims are 
challenged by others emanating from an opposite discourse. It is at the level of the 
problematic then that we can connect the ideology to its 'social bases' relate its theoretical 
claims to the state of the social structure and its dynamics, to the 'interests' of various 
social classes, their opposition as well as their coming together. It also become evident 
that the problematic need not remain fixed and unchanging. As 'historical conditions' 
change, so are new political possibilities thought out, the problematic undergoes a 
transformation within the same structure of discourse. With the help of the problematic, 
then, we seek to establish the political location as well as the historicity of nationalist 
discourse.7 
  
There is a distinct connection between national discourse, social structures, and historical 
realities. I would add that political identity formation is born out of historical realities that are 
shaped by administrative strategies and structures, particularly the political. Without a unified 
                                                                                                                                                             
  





framework of liberal nationalism with the impulse to create a common market, which was a 
challenge to the British, politics took on the necessary character of historical realities as defined 
by a manufactured static categorization of the Indian populace. 
The confines of the debate were set and the framework established under the 
generalizations produced about India and all rapprochements to power were made in that guise. 
To be suitable collaborators to the British, an Indian needed to present themselves in the terms 
that were legible to the colonial power, as elites that were both suitably English in the leadership, 
but had mass appeal to these fixed political categories that reflected an Indian history understood 
in these terms.  
In turning to colonial administrative strategies, the most influential author on this work is 
by far Mahmood Mamdani. In his most recent book, Define and Rule (2012), he outlines a very 
similar process to that which will be discussed later in this work. He identifies a shift in colonial 
administration after the upheaval of 1857 from one of civil law to customary law. While I agree 
that this shift does take place, it is more broadly a shift from direct to indirect rule of which this 
was one facet, however, this can be seen as the starting point for the institutionalization of 
traditionalized political identities. Mamdani lays out his argument quite succinctly in a recent 
lecture at the CUNY Graduate Center by first starting with,  
Queen Victoria’s proclamation after the 1857 uprising, “We declare it our royal will and 
pleasure that none be in anywise favored, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their 
religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial 
protection of the law. And we do strictly charge to enjoin all those who may be in 
authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or 
worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.”8  
 
                                                 




Mamdani then uses this as the basis for his argument that this,  
…turned into a charter for all around interference, for one reason. The occupying power 
gave itself the prerogative to define the boundaries of that in which it will not interfere, 
and then to define the content of the authentic religion with which there was to be no 
interference, and finally to acknowledge the authentic authority that would define and 
safeguard religion in its pure form, without external interference. So it gave itself the 
right to define the authentic religious authority, the authentic religion, and the boundaries 
of that religion. […] It was a political project to define allies of custom, and to define 
custom itself, and to define a platform for a defense of that custom and thereby the 
defense of those allies in order to stabilize colonial rule.9 
 
As we move through the historical analysis, this process will become increasingly identifiable 
and useful in understanding the choices of actors.  
In the book that popularized Mamdani’s’ work, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary 
Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Mamdani highlighted an aspect of colonial rule that 
critically influences his work and mine, “Together, segregation and customary law would create 
something more than just territorial segregation between the colonizer and the colonized, the 
settler and native; it would create an embryonic ‘institutional segregation.’”10 He recognizes in 
this statement the systemic nature of political formation that occurs under colonial rule. In the 
same work he, more specifically, brings attention to a shift from direct to indirect rule and, 
“stressed two aspects of the colonial situation in the early part of this century [the 20th]: the lack 
of personnel that every colonial power faced and the extreme difficulty in communicating over 
long distances.”11 These exerts are meant to demonstrate his early acknowledgement of the 
institutional factors in state formation as well as the necessity in the strategic shifts in colonial 
administration. This hints at what was to follow in his next title, When Victims Become Killers, 
                                                 
9 Mamdani, “Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity.”, Lecture 
10 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 63  




where he articulates the thrust of this work more accurately, “By taking seriously the historical 
backdrop to political events, I hope to historicize both political choices and those who made 
these choices. If it is true that the choices were made from a historically limited menu, it is also 
the case that the identity of agents who made these choices was also forged within historically 
specific institutions.”12 This is the essential focus of my argument, and the parallels that 
Mamdani will set up in his most recent work. The underpinning of my examination of the Indian 
partition rests on Mamdani’s’ description of political identity and how he understands it as part 
of state formation, as I do. He writes,  
I suggest we recognize that the process of state formation generates political identities 
that are distinct not only from market based identities but also from cultural identities. 
[…] To focus on the construction of political identity is not to deny significant overlaps – 
or interrelations or even determinations – among cultural, economic, and political 
processes. No Chinese Wall exists between the political and other domains. […] Yet, no 
one historicized the political legacy of colonialism, of the colonial state as a legal-
institutional complex that framed and set in motion particular political identities. […] as 
political identities undergirded and reproduced by institutions of colonial vintage…13 
 
Mamdani establishes that political identity is inseparably a result of the process of state 
formation. Since political identities are a part of the process of state formation he now moves 
onto to describe how they are defined,  
Political identities are the consequences of how power is organized. The organization of 
power not only defines the parameters of the political community, telling us who is 
included and who is left out, it also differentiates the bounded political community 
internally. This it does by acknowledging different kinds of identities in law. It is 
identities so acknowledged in law – and thus legally enforced – that form the basis of 
                                                 
12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda, 8  
13 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 




different political identities. Legal enforcement makes identities the basis of participation 
in state-organized institutional and political life.14  
 
He then goes on to illuminate what is meant by polarized political identity and how type of rule, 
indirect or direct, creates difference,  
Polarized identities give rise to a kind of political difference where you must be either 
one or the other. You cannot partake of both. The difference becomes binary, not simply 
in law but in political life. It sustains no ambiguity. Every state form generates specific 
political identities. I shall illustrate this…with regard to two forms of the colonial state, 
characterized by direct and indirect rule. Direct rule tended to generate race-based 
political identities: settler and native. Indirect rule, in contrast, tended to mitigate the 
settler-native dialectic by fracturing the race consciousness of natives into multiple and 
separate ethnic consciousness. Once we have understood the dynamic whereby 
distinctive forms of the colonial state tend to generate distinctive types of political 
identities, we shall be in a position to understand the process of formation of…political 
identities through different periods in…history.15 
 
Pulling these ideas into a symbiosis, the trajectory I intend to lay out concerning the partition of 
India, is theoretically grounded in a knowledge system, Orientalism, produced for colonial rule, 
which only takes into account the imperial perspective and broadly generalizes ‘natives’ into 
imagined static and fetishized groupings. The subaltern study group contributes to revealing 
some of the agency of Indian actors, but more importantly sheds light on the similarities between 
the Indian and British elite. It explores their common perspective, and how they have 
internalized the ‘civilizing’ project. It demonstrates the pervasiveness of Western thought and its 
necessity in the thinking and presentation to British power by elite Indians. It applies Said’s 
argument to the individual and group as these actors seek arbitration for rewards and 
punishments in the colonial system. Mamdani sees what I see, that the project of creating 
                                                 
14 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda, 22  
15 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 




political identities is part of the process of state formation in a colonial setting where these 
identities were specifically tied to institutional difference, articulated for colonial management. 
The system of indirect rule, born out of the problems of direct rule, sought to shape identities to 
serve colonial administration. The result of such a long period of rule based on institutionally 
differentiated political identities produced different political entities, and eventually different 
countries. In the case of colonial India it is not surprising that in 1947, when declared 
independent, two separate states emerged: Pakistan and India. This raises several questions about 
political identity formation. How did institutional arrangements contribute to political identity 
formation? What material cause motivated these formations? How did political identities become 
polarized? To approach these questions I will review the process and historical period from more 
than a century before and up until partition, during which colonial institutions and Indian 






Part I: Pre-Colonial India, the Upheaval of 1857, and the Beginning of the British Raj 
The upheaval of 1857 seemed the most appropriate launching point for our analysis for 
several reasons. One reason is the name itself. I have chosen to call these events the “Upheaval 
of 1857.” To the British and most of the western world it is known as the Sepoy Mutiny. To 
many Indians it is known as the First War of Independence. The events themselves are so 
polarizing that the naming of them, as we will learn is often the case and specifically so with 
regard to the British Raj’s categorization of its subjects, reveals the intent and thought behind 
those giving the name itself. For the imperial power it was a mutiny, to Indian nationalists it was 
the start of their self-determination. Another reason is that as a result of these events British 
administration changed drastically in two important ways: 1) The East India ceded control to the 
British Crown, and 2) The administrative strategy shifted from direct (a civilizing mission) to 
indirect (traditional/religious patronage networks) rule.  
To begin, I will cover the preceding period leading up to the upheaval and the events of 
it. Governing ideologies and their correlated administrative strategy, Orientalist (indirect rule) 
and Utilitarianism (direct rule), will be reviewed. I will lay out how their proponents developed 
their arguments as historical events proceeded, how these ideologies and strategies shifted over 
time, and eventually coalesced into an administrative policy predicated on class division, one for 
the elite and the other for the masses.  
Next, I will examine the aftermath and the administrative choices made in its wake, how 
through systematic community rewards and punishments the British reinforced political identity 
as primarily religious. This will demonstrate the administrative shift as well as the Indian 




The First War of Independence or the Sepoy Mutiny [1857 – 1859] 
  As the last Moghul Emperor left Delhi for exile, the beginning of a new British reign, the 
British Raj, was formulating in response to the bloodshed of the 1857 upheaval. The upheaval 
was, ostensibly, sparked by the use of new weapon cartridges in the Indian Army, rumored to 
contain pig or cow grease which was highly offensive to both Muslim and Hindu Sepoy (Indian 
soldiers). This was only the spark of the rebellion. There were long standing grievances that had 
coalesced and exploded, but the kernel that is necessary to understand the shift that this upheaval 
marked is in the governing strategy of the British. In the most serious respect,  
 The British should have known better. They should have remembered how, at the turn of 
the century, decades before 1857, sepoys in southern India had mutinied when ordered to 
remove their caste marks. And Hindu sepoys in the Afghanistan campaign of 1838 had 
expressed unhappiness at not being able to bathe as often as their religion demanded and 
became restless when weather forces them to wear sheepskin jackets (such contact with 
leather is forbidden to upper-caste Hindus).16  
 
  During the preceding century, the British had shifting administrative ideologies that each 
represented two ruling strategies, direct and indirect rule. There was ongoing tension between 
two schools of thought in this regard. The incarnation of administrative ideology, known as 
Orientalism, lent itself well to the strategy of indirect rule and was championed by Warren 
Hastings (governor-general of Bengal 1774-1785) who, “presumed that British interests would 
be best served by bringing peace and tranquility to the subcontinent and allowing Indian society 
to continue to function within its traditional socio-religious framework. […] Then there were the 
Utilitarian’s, who believed equally strongly that they had a duty to bring rationalism and 
enlightenment embodied in Western laws and civilization to the barbaric and superstitious 
                                                 




natives.”17 The ideology of Utilitarianism seemed to lend itself well to the strategy of direct rule. 
The ongoing debate between these two approaches over the course of the British Raj engendered 
two competing approaches and fostered a multifaceted response by Indian individuals, 
communities, and organizations as well as British functionaries.  
 Marquess Wellesley (governor-general, 1798-1805), … used the system of subsidiary 
alliance to firmly establish the British Empire of India, continued many of the Moghul 
political practices, suitably modifying them to ensure that the British paramountcy would 
remain unchallenged. […] founding the College of Fort William in Calcutta (1800), 
where British administrators got training in Indian languages, history, and Indian laws. 
[…] time ran out for the Orientalists when the East India Company changed its policies 
regarding British administration in India. The College of Fort William was closed in 
1830, and the new recruits to the civil service began to receive their training at the hands 
of the Cambridge clergy.18  
 
  This shift from genuine respect for, albeit from an imperial viewpoint, Indian systems 
and culture begot a grafting of British rule onto the Moghul systems under its supremacy and 
became a civilizing mission to turn these “backward” people into a highly administered and 
anglicized population, shifting from a system of indirect to direct rule. Instead of using the 
systems that had traditionally been the levers of authority a new schema had to be introduced.  
 The sense of European racial superiority that began to replace the Orientalists’ respect for 
Asian cultures is best reflected in the Utilitarian James Mill’s assessment of Indian and 
Chinese character in 1819; he found both peoples to be insincere, dissembling, 
treacherous, mendacious, cowardly, unfeeling, conceited, and “disgustingly unclean.” 
[…] It was during the regime of Governor-General Lord William Cavendish Bentinck 
(last governor-general of Bengal and the first governor-general of India 1833-1835) that 
the ascendancy of the Utilitarian-Evangelist combine first became apparent. Bentinck… 
did believe in the Utilitarian principles of the “maximum happiness of the maximum 
numbers,” and followed policies of reform intended for the good of the Indian peoples. 
[…] On quite a different plane, Bentinck revealed his positively anti-Orientalist attitude 
when he decided to expand English education at the expense of traditional Indian 
education…closure of the College of Fort William and another was a drastically reduced 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 66  




level of financial aid to such institutions as the Asiatic Society and the Calcutta Sanscrit 
College.19  
 
All of the institutions of learning about India, its people, languages, and cultures were being 
marginalized. The clear objective was to discount Indian knowledge systems and impose 
enlightened English education, move full boar into a system of direct rule. 
  The Orientalists had lost. Their respect for Indian society and culture was seen as 
misplaced and ineffective in supporting British rule. There is an ideological debate going on here 
for the justification of rule. If India was so great prior to the British why were they conquered 
and for what cause? It did nothing for the moral justification of the British to simply call it what 
it was, a commercial enterprise. While it was primarily a commercial enterprise, the study of 
Indians and India made good sense as a tool for conquest, one must know their object of 
conquest to facilitate effective coercion and since the British were outnumbered it was essential 
for them to form alliances and cultivate influence, rule indirectly. However, as the British 
consolidated it became harder to justify the study of its subjects; instead one must govern their 
subjects, directly. It becomes hard to make a case of just government over a people if you believe 
them to have such laudable attributes. It fits much more neatly into a moralistic narrative for rule 
when your subjects need to be saved as it were from the own savagery.  
  Bentinck operationalized these attitudes and took,  
 …the view of Charles Trevelyan and Thomas Babington Macaulay, the ardent 
Westernizers that English should be made the official language of India. Trevelyan 
ridiculed the Orientalists for trying to revive the “dead” Indian civilization, and Macaulay 
not only thought that the Indian people were ‘a race debased by three thousand years of 
despotism and priestcraft” but also believed that ‘a single shelf of a good European 
Library was worth the whole native literature of Arabia and India.” The idea, in 
                                                 




Macaulay’s words, was to create, through English education, “a class of persons, Indian 
in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect,” who 
would be interpreters between the rulers and the ruled.20  
 
  The shift away from respectful, even if overtly caricatured, Orientalist attitudes of India 
to this Westernizing mission in administrative affairs culminated in the 1857 explosion of 
violence against British direct rule. 
  This shift is precisely mirrored in the attitudes of the British towards their Sepoy soldiers.  
 
 In the early days, after the occupation of Bengal, when the East India Company’s army 
was still small and the company’s authority still not fully established, the officers had 
very good rapport with the sepoys. However, as the company territory, authority, and 
army expanded, an attitude of superiority and aloofness entered the officer corps. The old 
sense of intimacy between officers and men was replaced by distance and contempt. At 
the same time, the salary differential between the British noncommissioned officers and 
the Indian counterparts became so large that there was no possibility of any camaraderie 
between them. The ordinary sepoys were now often looked upon as menial servants and 
were often ill-treated.21 
 
 Again the shift from respecting the old system, indirect rule, and initially grafting British 
administration on top of Moghul paradigms, to one of replacement, and direct rule, fuelled the 
cause for rebellion. Previously, the British worked within a system of subservient alliances, and 
while this system did not totally erode the economic landscape many of the most important areas 
necessary to consolidate a contiguous territoriality for British rule were deceptively taken by pre-
rebellion anti-Orientalists like Governor-General Lord Dalhouise [1848-1856].  
  Dalhouise’s firm belief that British rule was more beneficial to the Indians than 
native rule led him to ruthlessly utilize the “doctrine of lapse” (which allowed the East 
India Company to take over any subsidiary state whose ruler had no natural heir) to 
“peacefully” annex the states of Satara, Jaitpur, Sambalpur, Jhansi, Nagpur, Baghat, 
Udaipur, and Karauli. […] Dalhousie’s action had the effect of removing pockets of 
native rule that came in the way of establishing territorial contiguity in British India. […] 
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The annexation of Avadh was carried out on the grounds that the current (“puppet”) 
nawab’s irresponsible administration had brought “suffering to millions.22 
 
   On May 12th, 1857, when the rebels reached Delhi, they proclaimed the elderly Bahadur 
Shah II the “Emperor of India.” He was the last vestige of the old Moghul authority. Although he 
had long before been humbled by the British and existed as their pensioner, he would serve as an 
appropriate unifying symbol for the cause. 23 “It was the first time in the history of India that so 
many disparate elements, from many diverse regions, although guided by conflicting aims and 
lacking a unified organization or program, made a foreign power the common target for 
attack.”24  
  The apathy and disrespect for traditional systems and beliefs that burst forth in the form 
of this mass upheaval made it very clear to the British that a shift was needed in administrative 
policy.  
 The termination of the rebellion brought to a close the East India Company’s rule in 
India, and on November 1, 1858, the British Crown assumed direct authority over the 
land. Queen Victoria’s proclamation promised that Britain would “respect the rights, 
dignity, and honor of native princes as our own,” and declared that the Crown felt “bound 
to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all 
our other subjects.” In the long run the second part of this grand and eloquent statement 
of intent proved hollow and inconsequential…25  
 
  The era that was marked by a belief in a truly civilizing mission that characterized the 30-
year period preceding the upheaval was over. Instead a new attitude seemed to emerge out of the 
violence, that Indians were indeed savage and that since they were primordial they needed to be 
governed as such, from atop and through intermediaries. This in practice meant the combination 
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of Orientalism and Utilitarianism, in a system of indirect rule predicated on two classes, elites 
which were there to serve as intermediaries and become civilized, and the masses that needed to 
be governed by tradition. Since law and order were the objectives, and it was believed as a result 
of the rebellion that the masses of India were not ready for English administration, they needed 
to be governed by the most traditional systems. In essence, the British took the worst of both. 
Orientalism became an increasingly caricatured categorization and Utilitarianism came to mean 
the maximum happiness for the maximum number of each tradition, those traditions being 
identified first and foremost with religion. The British then set out to further divide each 
identifiable grouping as it served their purpose of administration. The problem of the rebellion 
was its broad appeal across perceived cleavages. If the British were to continue to govern they 
needed to stress those cleavages and court their collaborators appropriately within the identities 
being emphasized by the British, they needed elites, traditional religious and civilized 
administrative intermediaries.  
 
Consequences of 1857 
 Although there was diverse support for the rebellion, when looking upon several 
institutions it was at its end a destruction of a vast amount of Muslim power. The capitulation of 
Avadh, the last territory seized under Dalhousie and the “doctrine of lapse,” was a large part of 
the resentment felt. “The reaction of the Muslim sepoys, and the Muslim population, was 
particularly violent because the nawab was the last surviving symbol of Muslim supremacy.”26 
In every respect the Rebellion of 1857 shaped the next century, initiating the institutionalization 
                                                 




of political identities as primarily religious. As a result, during the period leading up to the 
formation of All-India movements, a severe schism arose in the aspects of the daily life of 
Indians along religious lines, hardened through the British response to the upheaval. This is 
reflected in all of the institutions and administrative controls of the Raj. “The British did, indeed, 
feel that Muslims were more responsible than Hindus in creating the upheaval of 1857, and since 
Muslim loyalty and allegiance were suspect, the British favored the recruitment of Hindus into 
the administrative services.”27 They now sought to fix, as they had in their system of alliances 
previously, one side against the other in a bid to avoid cross-cleavage coordination as they 
moved from a system of direct to indirect rule. This allowed them to act as the sole arbitrator 
between the two religious categories and shape daily life in-kind through a system of associated 
rewards and punishments.  
 
  
                                                 




Part II: Institutionalization of Colonial Identity 
The period that followed the dramatic events of 1857 saw the implementation and 
entrenchment of imperial administrative strategies. I will examine several spheres of public life, 
their interaction with these strategies, and the consequences. This section will grapple with the 
division of society by the British and how that division served imperial objectives of divide and 
rule, linking these policies to the creation of hardening political identities with respect to a 
Muslim and Hindu divide as well as elites (civilizing) and masses (traditionalizing).  
I will first survey the role of education in both its content and its institutions. Looking at 
the gaps in education between the Hindu and Muslim population, as well as the associated 
institutions, will show who was educated and how. This will provide an understanding of how 
imperial administrative strategy was applied as a result of the events in 1857, and its effects. I 
will also approach the question of educational content as applied to elites and masses. Looking at 
the Indian census, the most clearly defined categorization of India’s population as compiled by 
the British, I will use their categorisation to analyze administrative strategies and imperial 
objectives.  
  Studying the legal system will lay out how justice was administered and codified by the 
British, and what effects that had on the daily life patterns of India’s population. Particular 
attention will be paid to division in law between Hindu and Muslims, as well as the sources of 
codification on which the British relied.  
  After reviewing several spheres of public life, the next logical step is to examine the 
formation of associations, the beginning of nationalism, and how the British classification of the 




at the elite level. Through these spheres and their connection to association formation, I will 
attempt to demonstrate how the naming of the populace and that categorization, put into practice 
in the public spheres, resulted in sharpening political identities.  
 
Manufacturing Colonial Identities: Elite Civilizing and Mass Traditionalism [1860 – 1884] 
In Education 
 The gap that existed in the period following the upheaval, in higher institutions of 
learning between the Hindu and Muslims was extensive,  
Hindu students (including a very high proportion of Brahmins) constituted an 
overwhelming majority in all these institutions while the percentage of Muslim students 
was far below the Muslim representation in the population of each presidency… To give 
a few examples, (1) in Bengal, more than half the population was Muslim, but between 
1836 and 1886, only 5.2 percent of the students who passed examinations at Calcutta 
University were Muslim (85.3 percent were Hindus); (2) in Madras Presidency, since 
91.4 percent of the population was Hindu and only 6.2 percent Muslim, it is more readily 
understandable why the number of Muslim students in the colleges would be small—in 
1881-82, Muslim students were 1.8 percent of the total, while Hindu students were 90 
percent; and (3) in Bombay Presidency, Muslims formed 18.4 percent of the population 
and the Hindus, 73.4 percent, but here, too, of the successful candidates in university 
examinations between 1876 and 1886, only 1.3 percent were Muslim, whereas Hindus 
constituted 72.6 percent.28  
 
 Following the upheaval the British looked elsewhere for their collaborators. The Muslims 
looked inward and became more insular, and the Hindus stepped into fill the void. “Muslim 
leaders still could not reconcile their Islamic fundamentalism with Western secular education. In 
1867, the Deoband School of ulama (Islamic scholars) developed a more rigid form of scriptural 
Islam. By 1900, forty schools connected with Deoband had been established to spread this 
                                                 




strictly orthodox form of Islam throughout India.”29 Without a path of incorporation into the 
British administration and a distinct preference for Hindus, Muslims turned to consolidating their 
identity and constructed a more rigid imagining, increasingly identifying with the broader 
Islamic community, the umma. Bolstering this belief and attracting many Indian Muslims was 
“the Iranian thinker Jamal-ud-din al-Afghani (1838-1897), who sought to resist the West by 
consolidating the world of Islam under the spiritual leadership of the Ottoman caliph… 
culminating in the 1919 pan-Islamic Khilafat movement.”30  
 As some Muslims looked elsewhere to remedy their “backwardness” the great Muslim 
leader, Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), “… an employee of the East India Company…supported 
the British during the 1857 revolt and was honored by them for his loyalty, emerged to 
rehabilitate his community in the eyes of the government […] The gist of his teaching was that 
an attitude that failed to allow ‘the Muslims to progress as a people… to make provision for 
education in those worldly sciences which are beneficial and useful, to ensure economic security, 
to open avenues of honest employment, to remove the blemishes in social life’ could not be 
‘justified in the eyes of God.’”31 Sir Syed went on to found the Translation Society (later 
renamed the Aligarh Scientific Society) in 1864 and the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College 
(known as the M.A.O. College or Aligarh College) which combined Arabic, Islamic, and 
Western studies. “The founders state the aim of the college was ‘to make the Muslims of India 
worthy and useful subjects of the British Crown; to inspire them with loyalty which flows… 
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from a sincere appreciation of the benevolence of a good government.’”32  
 Sir Syed was certainly an answer for the British as he embodied their ideals and was a 
useful counterbalance to an increasingly agitated Hindu dominated intelligentsia. Of course all of 
this education was made to produce, as was the initial project, Englishman in all but blood and 
color. This is made quite apparent by Ranajit Guha in his classic work, Dominance without 
Hegemony.  
For some of that evidence one may turn to a number of essays written by students of the 
Hindu College in answer to the question: “Has Europe or Asia benefited most by the 
discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope to India?” These essays were 
proudly exhibited by the school authorities at a prize-giving ceremony… Here is an 
excerpt from one of them.  
 
Of all the nations of Europe… the English have derived the greatest advantage by 
this passage…On the other hand it must be acknowledged, that it has also, in 
some measure, contributed to the good of Asia, particularly in the countries under 
the British sway; for in the time of the Mohammedan tyrants, nothing but luxury 
and oppression prevailed among the nobles; they had properly speaking, no fixed 
laws for the administration of justice. In fact, the Natives suffered the most 
mortifying proofs of their cruelties, until Providence, to avert the evil brought 
them under the illustrious sway of the English, who not only freed this country 
from the hands, but have adopted all possible measures for its amelioration, 
introducing arts, sciences, schools, academies and colleges for the dissemination 
of knowledge.  
 
 Another student, too, concluded in much the same vein, saying that as a result of 
that discovery “we are safe every way, improving in literature and sciences day by day, 
and shall continue to do so as long as the British patronizing sway shall rule over us.” 
Clearly the politics of collaboration caught natives young. The youthful enthusiasm for 
Western science and literature and the institutions set up to promote these was predicated 
unquestioningly on an appreciation of “the illustrious sway of the English.” After that 
there would be only one short step for the student to take before maturing into a 
committed loyalist as he left school for employment at a lower rung of the colonial 
administration…33  
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It was this type of individual that the system was designed to produce.  
The British introduced English-language education for elites in the 1830s after a long 
debate between competing schools. On one side stood the Orientalists, who argued that 
education should be conducted in the vernacular languages of India, because this would 
be the best means of conveying Western knowledge to Indian society as a whole. The 
benefits would trickle down from the small elite receiving such education to a broader 
base. Vernacular-language education would have helped maintain a link between Indian 
elites and the masses and preserved a certain degree of cultural autonomy and self-
respect. The Orientalists school lost out…34  
 
 The British for their part had maintained a cultural chauvinism; the true breadth of 
Western knowledge could only be conveyed fully in the English language. The vernacular was 
incapable of expressing it. The second reason for the Orientalists loss in this respect was 
administrative,  
…a more pragmatic note, suggesting that it would suit Britain’s imperial purposes to train 
an exclusive elite of Indians in English language and culture. This Anglicized elite 
would, they argued, become the cheap and willing subaltern bureaucracy of the Raj. The 
Anglicists won the debate in part because elements within the Indian elite supported 
them, groups ranging from cultural reformists who valued English as a passport to new 
knowledge to conservatives clerical groups who saw mastery of English as a means to 
promote their monopoly of administrative employment. In the early twentieth century, 
the British did become interested in vernacular mass education. But good intentions fell 
foul of budgetary constraints and a tendency to regard traditional religious institutions 
rather than the state as the proper providers of education.35  
 
As the British lesson from the rebellion had reinforced in their administrative mindset, the best 
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In the Census 
 As we turn to the Indian census the British intent becomes clearer. “After the Mutiny of 
1857, the ideological nature of social identities became more systematic and far reaching. 
Employing the new disciplines of statistics, anthropology, and ethnology, the British created and 
ordered hierarchical classification of the whole of Indian society through the mechanism of the 
decennial census. The census sought to identify the exact caste and religious affiliation of every 
Indian.”36 It was in this way that these disciplines acted on behalf of colonial power. Census data 
forms the basis of a self-image of a people, their territory in connection with their category, and 
internalizes these boundaries. The British were concerned with the census to ease administration 
and define their subjects, with a seemingly pervasive attitude to divide its subjects into useful 
administrative categories.  
Foucault rightly emphasised that power and knowledge are closely interconnected. 
Categorisation of people and the information generated about such categories in a country 
play an important interconnecting and supporting role between power and knowledge. 
These categories provide a characteristic legibility to a society by strongly influencing 
perceptions of us and the Others. No wonder that each political power generates 
information/data and knowledge in terms of its own interests and worldview. […] People 
who wield power as well as those who are capable of resisting the effects of power play 
the prime role in deciding social and spatial categories employed for the census and for 
administrative purposes. In quite a few cases, changes in census categories over time also 
manifest changing definitions of us and the Others and the nature of relationship between 
the two. In a way, census categories not only reflect social identities, but also help in 
creating new identities in tune with specific discourses of major political parties in a 
country. Such categories not only define different social strata, but also play a part in 
"locking in" individuals to specific groups. […] If it suits the ruling class(es) of a country 
to subdivide the Other, then a large number of census categories could be used as was 
done under the British rule in India.37  
 
In this respect the British were masterful in identifying divisions and reinforcing identity 
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boundaries. This is also completely consistent with Mamdani’s articulation of indirect rule, that 
to administer it effectively power needed to subdivide the native population against each other. 
In direct rule the power dynamic is between the settler and the native, but in an indirect rule 
administration the power dynamic must be between natives as defined by the colonial power, in 
this case being Muslim and Hindu. This dynamic was also demonstrated within the Hindu 
category as well and was recognized by the individuals and groups being enumerated as either 
divisive or solidifying to their imagined community or defined category. 
Religion has been a regular and an important item in Indian census since the first census 
in 1871. […] Right from the beginning of the census in India in 1871, there have been 
strong views for and against collection of data on castes. The support for or opposition to 
census data by caste transcends Left-Right dichotomy as both "Left liberals and upper-
caste Hindu Rightists" could be seen joining together on both sides of the fence. Those 
who support inclusion of caste for census purposes argue that since caste is an 
inseparable feature of India's social life, it deserves to be reflected in the census returns. 
The opponents believe that caste data would work to erode the imagined solidarity of 
Hindu society. It is important to note that it is mainly the people from upper castes who 
are against census by caste, while those from lower castes invariably welcome such an 
effort. Caste data were also collected for all the religious groups, including the Christians, 
in the 1871 Census. However, as the protestant missionaries were opposed to inclusion of 
caste for the Christians, this practice was discontinued for them at the 1881 Census. 
Similarly, as the Muslim League was ideologically "against the mention of 'caste' among 
the Muslims", the list of caste for the Muslims gradually got shortened after 1921.38  
 
The effective results of census politics is this: if you want to create a more unified imagined 
community use less census categories and use more to divide an imagined community creating 
several. In order to prioritize identity, make the intended division the first category, in this case 
religion. As subjects reading the census, the differences are internalized. If the first category of 
division is religion then this is also being conveyed to the subjects of the census as the most 
important of their identities. From an imperial standpoint segmenting the Muslim community is 
                                                 




perfectly logical.  
…the British set out to establish precise boundaries between South Asia’s Hindu and 
Muslim communities. The British were always wary of India’s Muslims as the elite from 
whom they replaced the Moghuls. Muslims also constituted around 25 percent of the 
Indian population before partition (and still account for 10 percent of the Indian 
population now), though this number hides their heterogeneity in terms of sectarian, 
class, regional, and linguistic allegiance. The British, however, considered them a unified 
and potentially threatening group that had to be appeased. This belief grew stronger after 
the Mutiny of 1857, an event with complex causes, but which many British officials 
attributed to Muslim fanaticism. After 1857, British policy privileged certain Muslim 
groups in order to diffuse this threat.39  
 
This is all perfectly in line with the post-1857 British policy of indirect rule that traditionalized 
Indian society. It presumed that these categories were fixed, caste and religion being the 
dominant socio-political categories of India and as a result they have become fixed. Through 
imagined, and then internalized categorization, the people of India were placed under the yoke of 
an outsider’s ethnography. In fact these categories were not as fixed as the British made them.  
In most cases these identities were quite fluid, in pre-colonial India, caste (or jati as it 
would have been known) was a highly fluid and essentially local identity. The British, 
under Brahmin influence, replaced this fluidity with the much more rigid classical Hindu 
four varna system, with Brahmins at the top and untouchables at the bottom. […] the 
effect of these relentless attempts to identify reliable collaborators through pseudo-
scientific and pseudo-historical research undoubtedly hardened the previously fluid 
boundaries between Indian communities.40  
 
The British had indeed learned their lesson from the upheaval of 1857, Indians were a primitive 
race and needed to be managed by their traditions through indirect rule. This in turn gave undo 
sway to the gatekeepers of those traditions, in the case of Islam they turned to the ulama and in 
the case of the Hindus they turned to the Brahmans. It is not surprising that when one asks 
deeply religious individuals or textual scholars that they would have a more orthodox view, a 
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more rigid interpretation then would be expected of their own congregations. These views being 
perceived as the basis of Indian society were taken up by the British and differences in the form 
of the census were reemphasized, traditionalizing and fixing identities to their “purest” form as 
defined by the colonial power through religious orthodoxy. Again, this harkens back to 
Mamdani’s interpretation of the Queens proclamation, that the British identified collaborators 
that defined and created a symbiosis with those that ruled. This in no small measure played a role 
in shaping the imagination of political associations, communities, and identity. One only needs to 
ask a number of counterfactuals to quickly discover what an impact this system of knowledge 
can have in ordering an individual’s view of society, what if class was made the first category, 
wouldn’t solidarity be the anticipated outcome? This could be expected of a Marxist government 
as the intent of that power would be to highlight social class inequality. In this context the goal 
of power was to govern by tradition construed as primarily religion and as a result this was the 
focus of their categorization. 
 
In the Legal System 
 Perhaps the first area of political identity consolidation took place in the legal system. As 
this is the system of arbitrating dispute and maintaining order, it is logical that this is the first 
arena that the British sought to codify. Again the British rely on text and have turned what was 
once a more fluid situation dependent on local cultural norms into a state apparatus that can be 





…the Company state under Lord Cornwallis nevertheless began modifying Islamic 
criminal and civil law to better fit its own requirements. This was done by making a 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ law. One way to restrict opposition to judicial 
innovations was to undertake not to interfere in the personal laws of India’s religious 
communities. Although consistent with pre-colonial practice, Muslim and Hindu 
sovereigns had never professed indifference towards religion. The legitimacy of temporal 
sovereignty had always depended on some measure of religious sanction. Muslim rulers, 
for the most part, acknowledged the supremacy of the sharia even while expanding their 
temporal authority under qanun-i-shahi or the law of the sovereign. Non-Muslims 
retained their personal laws but were subject to the qanun-i-shahi and aspects of Islamic 
criminal and civil law. So if a dichotomy marked the private and public laws of non-
Muslims in Moghul India, no such distinction existed for Muslims prior to the 
establishment of the Company state. It was colonialism’s marshalling of the existing 
sources of cultural legitimacy in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century India 
which, in separating the public from private, most profoundly effected redefinitions of 
social identities. In the case of the Muslims, this was done by gradually denuding the 
Islamic sharia—erroneously interpreted as an immutable code of laws and not a set of 
moral precepts to be loosely applied according to local circumstances—of its civil and 
criminal components and defining it as Islamic ‘personal’ law. Colonial officials also 
began compiling, if not always codifying the shastras, which were seen as the Hindu 
counterpart to the Islamic sharia. Lending greater rigidity to both Muslims and Hindu 
personal law, derived from textual sources rather than actual social practices, may have 
been an unwitting result of the colonial state’s search for a semblance of cultural 
legitimacy by appropriating aspects of Indian traditions. […] Indians were to be the 
subjects of the British Crown with fewer civic rights than religious. Forced to fall back on 
the religious community, Muslims as well as non-Muslims couched their demands for 
rights in terms of identifiable interests. Discussions on civic rights were for the most part 
marginalized by a public discourse claiming to project the identity and interests of 
religious communities. Discrepancies between official discourse and social realities, even 
when seemingly effaced by the narratives of communitarian interests appearing in print, 
continued to haunt the colonial bureaucracy at each level of the administration. Nowhere 
was this more apparent than in the domain of the colonial legal system where being a 
Muslim did not entail the blanket application of Islamic law. Confronted with a welter of 
regionally and locally specific social arrangements governing the lives of their Muslim 
subjects, colonial officials pragmatically accommodated customary deviations from 
Islamic sharia. This ensured that the Muslim remained more of an abstract legal category 
than a social entity whose life was ordered according to the precepts of religious 
doctrine.41  
 
                                                 




As in all aspects of British rule in India, they sought to codify peoples into neat little boxes 
having little understanding of the real cleavages of society, manufacturing, although previously 
existing, hardened political identities into the daily life of Indians.  
In the examination of the legal and education systems, along with respect to the census 
the British solidified identities that had previously been far more fluid than in these systematic 
epistemological articulations, establishing behavior patterns that over time did hamper the 
construction of a secular Indian national identity and segregated daily population patterns, 
resulting in the reinforcement of colonially imagined communities. Benedict Anderson identifies 
this well in his work, Imagined Communities,  
The new demographic topography put down deep social and institutional roots as the 
colonial state multiplied its size and functions. Guided by its imagined map it organized 
the new educational, juridical, public health, police, and immigration bureaucracies it was 
building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies which were, however, always 
understood in terms of parallel series. The flow of subject populations through the mesh 
of differential schools, courts, clinics, police stations and immigration offices created 
'traffic-habits' which in time gave real social life to the state's earlier fantasies.42  
 
In Association Formation 
 All of these entrenchments towards religious political identity in the system of 
administration resulted in reflective association formations. As the class of Orientalist-Utilitarian 
inspired British educated Indians came to the forefront and began petitioning for their say in the 
government, the tension between Western ideas of representation and the indirect traditionalized 
administrative system were brought to the surface. The question became at what point are the 
Indians ‘ready’ to govern themselves. The subservient alliance of traditional collaborator 
                                                 





networks turned into associations, new communitarian nationalists emerged, as well as a budding 
secular Indian nationalism. The British for their part set up a system that,  
“…exerted much influence in shaping the social and cultural identities of “natives” 
competing to present themselves as the most suitable collaborators. […] Much of 
Britain’s imperial power rested not on these institutions, but on far more informal and 
indirect mechanisms. They exerted power through semi-independent Indian princes, 
clerics and community leaders, powerful landlords, wealthy urban magnates, and other 
traditional power groups. […] These groups were not the dynamic nation-builders of the 
eighteenth century, but the toothless successors, rendered dependent on British largesse, 
shorn of real authority in Indian society, and used to lend an aura of continuity, tradition, 
and, it as was hoped, legitimacy to an imperial system.”43  
 
The duplicity arose when one considers the dueling basis for legitimacy that is represented by 
these networks in contrast to associative formations. The British both had a vested interest in 
providing lip service to Western ideals for government to its educated Indian administrators and 
also maintaining traditional patronage networks. This was most commonly resolved for Indians 
by attempting to combine Western teachings with the traditional. The Aligarh movement in 
general is a great example and effectively accomplished a symbiosis. It also accomplished the 
imperial goal of undermining any potential proto-nationalistic unity by empowering group based, 
majority-minority politics. One of the most expedient allies in this endeavor was the trusted 
British servant and founder of the Aligarh movement, Sir Syed.  
Until about 1880, or there about, Sir Syed still considered Hindus and Muslims as 
“belonging to the same nation,” but in 1883, when the British government began to 
discuss the possibility of conceding to Indian demands for elected local governments, Sir 
Syed expressed his fear that “the system of representation by election means the 
representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population… [which] 
would totally override the interests of the smaller community.” It was for this reason that 
Sir Syed turned against the Indian National Congress soon after it was established in 
1885 and in 1888 founded an organization of his own, the United Indian Patriotic 
Association, which aimed at preserving “peace in India and strengthen British rule; and to 
                                                 




remove those bad feelings from the hearts of the Indian people, which the supporters of 
Congress are stirring up throughout the country and by which great dissatisfaction is 
being raised among the people against the British government. […] It was the fear that 
Hindus would dominate Indian administration and politics if, and when, the British left 
the country that drive Sir Syed to change his view (expressed in 1883) that “India is like a 
bride which [sic] has got two beautiful and lustrous eyes—Hindus and Mussulmans,” to 
the totally contradictory ones he expressed in 1888, when he said that the “two nations,” 
the Muslims and Hindus, could not sit “on the same throne and remain equal in power.” 
[…] As Maulana Azad (1888-1958), a highly respected Muslim nationalist leader put it, 
“[as late as 1912] the leadership of Muslim politics…was in the hands of the Aligarh 
party. Its members regarded themselves as trustees of Sir Syed Ahmad’s policies. Their 
basic tenet was that Muslims must be loyal to the British Crown and remain aloof from 
the freedom movement.”44  
 
As Sir Syed firmly towed the British line throughout the period following the upheaval of 1857 
and influenced Muslim political development far beyond his death, the Hindu community made 
various attempts to grapple with combining Western education with Hindu belief. This was 
manifested in the form of several movements including the Brahma Samaj, Ramakrishna, and 
Arya Samaj. Brahma Samaj, founded by Raja Rammohan Roy, had as it main tenet the belief 
that Hinduism was at its core monotheistic, which found intense displeasure form orthodox 
Hindus.45 The succeeding movement, Ramakrishna, went further promoting the idea that, “the 
inherent truth in all religions was the same and that the gods of all religions were the same Great 
God who is one and many, with and without form, and who may be conceived either as a 
universal spirit or through symbols.”46 The third movement, Arya Samaj, “fulminated against the 
evils that had crept into Hinduism ever since it moved away from the Vedas…vigorously 
attacked idolatry, caste, child marriage, discrimination against women, and superstitions such as 
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the ban on travel overseas and faith in horoscopes.”47 Unfortunately, the tone and nature of these 
movements was rooted in Hindu texts, and often adversarial towards Muslim history and 
religious customs. The Arya Samaj was known for chronicling examples of historical injustices 
done by Muslims to Hindu.48 In a bid to reimagine a glorious Hindu past, much like the 
Orientalists, these groups sharpened the divide between Hindu and Muslim by reinforcing their 
differences. It is in this environment that the seeds of nationalism are formed through 
associations. While Sir Syed seems to have amalgamated an acceptable synthesis of political 
Islam in the service of the British through his religious-political associations, Hindus leaders 
appear to have taken a more fractured religious-political discourse. As has just been briefly 
discussed, a few of the religious reform movements at the same time there were burgeoning 
secular association being formed. Although it must be said that these associations, like Sir 
Syed’s, were often religiously insular. In this way many of the intermediaries sought to appease 
from atop the British in their “civilizing” mission and from the bottom the masses by evoking 
their religious categories and group symbology. 
 Demonstrating the various strains of proto-nationalism and preceding the Indian National 
Congress were several organizations that formed the basis for emerging nationalist thought. The 
first, which is indicative of how identity was being politically constructed, was the Society for 
the Promotion of National Feeling among The Educated Natives of Bengal. Founded by 
Rajinarayan Basu in 1866, the society’s mission was, “to promote ancient India’s ‘enlightened 
customs…such as female education, personal liberty of females, marriage by election of bride, 
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marriage of adult age, widow re-marriage, inter-marriage, and travel to distant countries,’ and to 
revive respect for Indian medicine, arts, music, physical exercises, and native languages. The 
society also aimed to ‘introduce such foreign customs as have a tendency to infuse national 
feelings into the minds of its members.’”49  
 The Orientalists had certainly imparted their zeal for a ‘reclaimed’ Indian history to the 
reformers who emerged in the latter half of the 19th century. In doing so they had also imparted a 
sanitized and simplistic understanding of the past as a unified community, predominantly under 
the auspices of religious categories. What nationalism meant to the National Society (an 
affiliated organization born out of Rajinarayan Basu association) was starkly revealed when a 
reader of their National Paper wrote in criticism of the term National in their title since their 
makeup was purely Hindu. The response was, “We do not understand why our correspondent 
takes exception to the Hindus who certainly form a nation by themselves, and as such a society 
established by them can very properly be called National Society.”50 The editor went on to 
expound the thinking behind his statements on other occasions, “just as love of country promoted 
nationalism among the Greeks and the Mosaic law among the Jews, the basis of national unity in 
India was Hinduism. ‘Hindu nationality,’ he said, ‘embraces all of Hindu name and Hindu faith 
throughout the length and breadth of Hindustan…The Hindus are destined to be a Hindu 
nation.’”51 How apparent the political consequences of Orientalism had become. Neglecting a 
shared history that involved diverse and intertwined narratives, the indigenous population had 
truly internalized their colonially constructed political identity. The project inaugurated in the 
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first half of the century found itself entrenched into the perspective of those Western, and more 
appropriately British, educated Indians that seem to have found synthesis in the Utilitarian 
“civilizing mission,” but with the foundation being an Orientalist imagining of fixed Indian 
communities, emphasizing religious difference as the foremost ordering principle. Under this 
guise, and seeking the benefits under British power, it seems the logical union of these ideas 
would result in the greatest benefits for the colonially defined and imagined community.  
 Through these associations the divisions were made increasingly rigid and reflected the 
British conceptualizations of traditional Indian society, making these syntheses the basis for 
presenting economic interests to the British in a bid to garner the most benefits to one’s 
powerbase. These divisive organizations reflected the system of knowledge and categorization 
set up by the British that enabled an ease to indirect rule based upon them. The real threat was 
coming, the real threat to the British system did not stem from these groups, but by those who 
refused to see the Indian nation as a segment of its people. A people long under Moghul, 
independent, or as was during this period, British rule. The real threat was those who saw a 
shared history and rebuked the classification of a nation as sectarian, but as all of the peoples 
under British rule with a shared yoke and shared interests. This was a threat of imagination. If 
the people of India could imagine themselves as one, they could oppose the British as one, and 
that would be catastrophic to their power. It was because of this that the British undercut any 
broadly appealing organization and opted to lend support to the organizations that fit into their 






Part III: Origin and Development of Parallel Politics 
 This section broadly examines the origins of political movements and associations, as 
well as the sectarian and British dialectics that shaped political developments and outcomes. 
Examined here is the formation of political associations, their consolidation at the all-Indian 
level, British involvement and responses. This will trace the interaction between Muslim and 
Hindu politicians from their initial cooperation and their political identification primarily as 
Indian to their formation of parallel organizations along the lines of a sectarian divide fostered by 
the British and collaborating religious officials.  
 First, I explore the Indian Association, set up by Surendranath Banerjee in 1876, and the 
events that led to its consolidation into the Indian National Congress (INC). Following is a 
further look at the period of all-India political formations, particularly, the INC and Muslims 
League. I will look at the fluidity of membership between the two associations and how that 
fluidity was eroded. Finally, we will focus on the granting of native seats in administration, the 
internal discourse in Britain, Indian responses and outcomes.   
 
Origins of All-India Political Associations 
 The first non-sectarian political association that made broad appeals to the Raj’s subjects 
was the Indian Association, founded in 1876 by Surendranath Banerjee and based in Calcutta. 
The goal of the organization was stated as follows: 
1. The unification of the Indian races and peoples on the basis of common political 
interest and aspirations 
 2. The promotion of friendly relations between Hindus and Muslims 




creation of a strong body of public opinion.52  
 
This was indeed the British opposition, one that called for all of the Raj’s subjects to unite in 
mass and irrespective of creed, and very much founded in the Western tradition. It was the very 
organization of educated Indians that had been hoped for to establish self-rule. It was the very 
British education that helped expose many of these leaders to the ideas of Western liberalism, 
which was at odds with colonial rule. If the mission was to make Indians British in all but blood 
and color, how could it not be expected for them to want, like the British, self-rule? How could 
Indians absorb the same liberal thinkers and not find contradiction in their own society. The two 
concepts of power, in theory and practice, were at odds. Indeed the British had imparted their 
liberal ‘wisdom,’ and in so doing found the greatest challenge to their established system of 
indirect traditional rule in India, Western liberalism.  
 Surendranath Banerjee embodied this ideal as evidenced in his statements, “In the name 
…of a common country, let us all, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees, members of the great 
Indian Community, throw the pall of oblivion over the jealousies and dissensions of bygone 
times and, embracing one another in fraternal love and affection, live and work for the benefit of 
a beloved fatherland.”53 The first incarnation of a democratic impulse came in the form of the 
British Indian Association founded in Bengal by leading zamindars (landlords) and was 
succeeded by like associations in Madras and Bombay, advocating for many of the issues that 
would eventually become the basis for later demands. Chiefly, they were concerned with 
appointing Indians to legislatures and high judicial posts, holding the civil service exam in India 
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(to allow greater access for Indians), tax policy, and the plight of plantation cultivators.54 Many 
of these demands had real roots in economic activity and the grievances of moneyed classes that 
were losing out on potential profits due to British policy. Banerjee lead massive protest meetings 
against British policy and in,  
1879 and 1880, the Indian Association in its annual meeting discussed the question of 
self-government and came to the conclusion that local self-government must precede 
national self-government. To prepare the people for the first step, the association 
increased its activities in the district towns, encouraging them to send petitions to the 
government to introduce the elective system in the municipalities. When the Local Self-
Government Act came into force in 1884, the association urged people to participate in 
the elections and try to get nonofficials to be presidents of the local bodies. But the act 
offered very little independence to these local bodies, and…they lost interest.55  
 
Again, these efforts seem entirely consistent with a good liberal Brit. They were simply 
requesting a greater stake in their administration, like other subjects of the Crown had done, but 
to no avail. Banerjee continued to pursue his secular nationalist aims.  
 Sir Syed and later Banerjee would both be knighted for their support of the British, as the 
two appeased and made themselves legible to power by operating inside of British procedural 
norms. They did not seek to overthrow British rule, but participate in it more broadly. What 
separated the two men, is the community for which they imagined themselves seeking support. 
In the case of Sir Syed, he was seeking to obtain greater benefits for Muslims. To Banerjee’s 
credit, he was seeking to obtain greater benefits for all of the Raj’s subjects, imagining a multi-
faceted Indian community, an Indian people of many races, religions, and creeds as one. This 
conceptual difference most likely explains the British attitude towards the soon to be founded 
Indian National Congress (INC) as opposed to the Aligarh movement. The British readily 
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accepted Sir Syed as the representative of the Muslim community because he fit neatly into the 
British traditional conceptualization of Indian society, while Banerjee’s aspirant organizations 
confronted the British with a modern interpretation of an Indian nation and this simply did not fit 
into the administrative strategy of indirect rule. It was a challenge to the system, whether 
Banerjee was conscious of it or not, and his subsequent loyalty to British rule leads me to believe 
that he did not see the challenge to British indirect rule in these terms.  
 In 1883 Banerjee organized an, “’all-India’ Indian National Conference in Calcutta, with 
representatives from all parts of India… The conference was not sectional or regional, but truly 
national; among the more than 100 delegates there were Hindus and Muslims representing over 
twenty urban areas, including Bombay, Madras, Delhi, Lahore, and Ahmedabad.”56 Two years 
later, the Indian National Congress was formed as the assemblage for unified political action as 
was stated in the first resolution put the floor, “From today forward we can with greater propriety 
then heretofore speak of an Indian nation, of national opinion and national aspirations.”57 
 
Indian National Congress & The Muslim League [1885 – 1905} 
 The INC was not conceived as a challenge to the British, but as part of the same British 
administrative debate that had occurred over a half century before between the Orientalists and 
Utilitarian’s. On one side Britain’s, who like the Orientalists, had a deep respect for India, its 
peoples and their ambitions, and others whom like the Utilitarian’s, were more focused on 
introducing “civilization” and managing rule,  
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…the credit of convening the Congress must go to Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912). 
Hume was a high-ranking ICS officer who had retired to Shimla in 1892 after thirty-three 
years of service, and his liberal views and sympathies for Indian aspirations were well 
known. Hume was general secretary of the Congress for twenty-two years, from its 
inception to 1908. Because of Hume, the inauguration of the Congress also received the 
indirect support of Viceroy Lord Dufferin, who possible believed that such a body of 
Indian politicians could function as a loyal opposition and a safety valve, and help the 
government to keep in touch with public opinion58  
 
The British were instrumentally shaping the path from both sides. It was the embodiment of the 
original administrative idea of Indian elite, British in all things but blood and color playing itself 
out against the Raj. Hume was just as British as his Indian INC counterparts, but the Raj 
administration, based on a system of patronage and alliances, was yet to see the threat from a 
national organization that was using the language of the British parliament to request 
representation in kind. As Englishmen it seems ironic hypocrisy on the part of the British to not 
expect these Indian “Englishmen” to demand a voice in the government as they had. In that 
respect, the INC was certainly,  
…not conceived as a political party. It was more like a club where the leaders of the 
country met once a year with the intention of coming to know each other better, “to 
promote personal friendship and intimacy.” This friendly intercourse was meant to help 
eradicate religious, racial, and regional prejudices and aid in consolidating sentiments of 
national unity. […] The difference between the Congress and the earlier associations was 
that the Congress was an all-India body that presumed to reflect national aspirations and 
speak for the nation.  To begin with, this was a hollow claim. But as the activities and the 
membership of the Congress expanded, and its programs gained wider support from the 
press and the public, as the British government shifted its stand and began to view the 
Congress as a seditious body, and as the Congress got disillusioned with the governments 
hesitating policies of reform and changed its tactics, the Congress did, indeed, become a 
genuine national organization…59 
 
 It was in this early period, at its inception and the preceding three years, that the INC 
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really exemplified the project of a secular Indian nationhood, an identity modeled on the Western 
ideal. These were the long sought after collaborators that could be the intermediates between the 
Crown and the ‘natives.’ The problem that emerged was the inconsistency of these British 
Indians secular conceptualization of a nation with the dominant administrative paradigm of 
indirect rule. That paradigm being that India was filled with systems of primordial traditionalism 
and divisive fixed identities that had existed unchanged from time immemorial. The imagining of 
a new expansive Indian nationalism, not grounded in these divisions, was the greatest challenge 
to the British system of domination.  
 To the British, the contention was that the INC was simply a small unrepresentative club, 
there to inform the British of ‘native’ opinion. The dilemma for Indians seeking systemic 
rewards was the best path to pursue, to appear British and remain a ‘club’ of elite collaborators 
acting as a ‘safety valve’ or to take up the banner of traditionalism and garner mass support. Sir 
Syed did both and as the INC attempted to do both those branches pulled apart into radicals and 
moderates, traditional/religious nationalist and secular nationalist.  
In 1886, the National Conference of Surendranath Banerjee merged with the Congress. In 
the same year, the national and secular stance of the Congress got a sharper definition 
when Dadabhai Naoroji, in his presidential address at the Calcutta session, asserted that 
the Congress should have a political platform and discuss only those matters that affected 
the whole of India, steering clear of social questions. It is noteworthy that the number of 
delegates at Calcutta—they had been elected and not nominated—was 436 as against 72 
in the first session, the number of Muslim delegates being 33 as against the original 2. By 
the third session, held in Madras in 1887 under the presidency of Badruddin Tyabji, it 
was evident that the Congress was becoming a more broad-based organization: not only 
did the 120 members of the Madras Reception Committee include Hindus, Muslims, and 
Christians, but it collected a sizable amount of money from contributions made by the 
rich and the poor; […] Among the 607 elected delegates, a foreign observer noted 45 
peasants and 19 artisans.60  
                                                 





In the same year Sir Syed rebuked the INC and “declared that Hindus and Muslims were two 
distinct races; that representative institutions were unsuited to India because they would lead to a 
permanent subjugation of Muslims by Hindus; and that Indian Muslims should depend on the 
British to safeguard their interests. […] the British divide-and-rule policies, Sir Syed’s 
overwhelming influence, Hindu revivalism, and the rise of the extremist faction in the Congress 
began to alienate the Muslims; between 1893 and 1905 the percentage of Muslim delegates fell 
to 7.1, as against 13.5 for the period 1885-1892.”61 The divide between these periods is 
encapsulated by The Indian Councils Act of 1892 which typified the didactic debate going on in 
both the colonial state and in Britain proper between liberals who aligned themselves with 
secular Indian aspirations and conservatives who vested power in the alliance between the 
British administration and its coopted traditional networks of patronage.  
 
British Maneuvering over the Indian Councils Act of 1892 
 While the INC emerged with the help of a former British civil servant increasingly 
engendering wider appeal and broad based support in the period of 1885-1892, the British at 
home fought parliamentary battles over India’s administrative future. The Whigs, the liberal 
party, and the Tories, the conservative party, embroiled themselves in an ongoing debate over 
Indian aspirations throughout this period leading up to The Indian Councils Act of 1892. The 
elective principle was at the center of this debate and the emerging arguments focused on 
maintaining domination. The issue was how to allow the educated loyal ‘British’ Indians to 
                                                 




participate in administering the colonial apparatus. The British were all too aware of the 
emerging frustration and growth of extremists while they dithered on reforms. As the INC 
developed, so did the question of an Indian government enquiry. However, the Whig government 
waned and the conservative Tories took over, the question of despotic Indian government was 
consistently put to the back burner to spite parliamentary wrangling.62 It was Viceroy Dufferin, 
who during his last moments in the office, convened,  
…a committee of three members of the executive… appointed to report upon the reform 
of the provincial councils. […] The committee recommended that the provincial 
legislature should consist of two divisions of members, both of which should contain 
elected representatives. The divisions would reflect the traditional ordering of Indian 
society. Non-official members would be elected to the first division by ‘the heredity 
nobility and the landed classes’, and to the second by the trading, professional and 
agricultural classes. The electors for the second division would be the members of the 
municipal committees and local boards, and members of the senates of the universities 
and holders of higher degrees. Since it seemed impossible to secure the representation of 
European settlers and minority groups within Indian society by election, certain non-
official members of the second division should, however, be appointed by nominations. 
There would be official members in both divisions, and in both they would be in the 
majority.63  
 
From the moment the elective principle is conceived it was done as an extension of imperial 
power. The intent was to bring these formerly unaffiliated associations into the fold, to coopt any 
instances of secular nationalism. To bring into these newly created administrative positions those 
who would outside of it challenge the status-quo, to greater incentivize systemic rewards for 
participating in the system as oppose to throwing stones at it. It was also a highly pragmatic 
approach to the problem of the INC’s budding divisions between moderates and extremists. 
Dufferin wrote, “that he intended, by reforming the provincial councils, to ‘give full play to the 
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legitimate and praiseworthy ambitions of the loyal, patriotic and educated classes in India, who 
are desirous of taking a larger share than hitherto in the transaction of the public business of the 
respective Provinces’. […] Britain’s policy must be to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of 
educated Indians to participate in government, but to rebuke ‘such of the Congress demands and 
proceedings as… [seemed] extravagant and reprehensible’.”64 Dufferin’s ironic contempt for the 
INC and reform minded, for the period, administrative thrust seems at odds, but his predecessor 
Lansdowne, summed it up nicely. He wrote that, “A timely concession… ‘would…take a great 
deal of the wind out of the sails of the Congress, whereas, if the reform is delayed to long, it will 
be assuredly regarded as having been extorted from us.’ Lansdowne was impressed by the 
‘temperate spirit’ of the Congress meetings at Allahabad in December 1888 and thought that the 
moderate leaders ‘would be delighted to shake themselves clear’ of the extremists.”65  
 Unfortunately, these are the periods that create extremists, those periods where hope is 
held out and snatched away. There appeared to be momentum building for reform over the past 
decade, with the emergence of all-India organization, secular proto-nationalism, and British 
support in the form of the Whig government. This all came to a disappointing sunder with the 
Tory government, which squandered an opportunity to empower those moderates. With the 
absence of any seeming progress those who championed more agitation started garnering support 
and rifts emerged. In the face of a secular national project losing steam the extremist alternative 
was an appeal to masses routed in colonially manufactured categories, religious rhetorical 
appeals to uneducated masses hardened cleavages and thwarted burgeoning national bonds that 
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transcended religion. Instead of a unifying moderate secular nationalism, divisive religious based 
nationalism began to emerge as a stronger trend in all-India politics. In effect the British had 
made it look like moderation was no path to liberation and when constitutional or legal means 
are imagined as fleeting or impossible, those who imagine destructive means are always lent 
more credence. Sadly, the delay in implementing reforms reinforced religious identity as 
frustrated Indians began to articulate their demands on a religious basis, reviving Hindu 
nationalism and for Sir Syed, forming two races of people. It simply made it increasingly 
difficult to imagine a secular Indian community and shaped the political discourse along 
religious lines as those identities took increasing primacy over others.  
 The British imagining of an Indian identity became increasingly reified in practice. For 
Muslims an alternative was presented by Sir Syed, the “Mohammadan Educational Conference, 
which had been established in 1886 expressly to oppose the Congress.”66   
Between 1886 and 1892 the purpose of the Whig statesmen who were concerned with 
Indian affairs was to forestall radical nationalism demands by offering timely 
concessions. They would preserve the essentially despotic character of the government 
whilst offering facilities for the expression of representative Indian opinion and extending 
opportunities for the employment of Indian talent in provincial administration. The 
centres of political activity among Indians were to be moved from the non-official reform 
associations and Congress to the legally constituted municipal and district bodies and to 
the councils. The Whigs wanted to come to terms with nationalism in India… […] Their 
progress was slow and their achievement was small. Even for a Whig the [eventual 
Indian Councils] Act of 1892 was too little too late.67  
 
The effect of this policy was institutionalizing the difference, “For the colonial power… It had 
already discovered, legitimized and entrenched the differences within the legal system; it was 
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time to politicize it. The Indian Councils Act of 1892, which allowed ‘communal’ nomination to 
government councils, initiated the policy of separate representation.”68 
 The intentions of the British administration were given greater clarity,  
…under Viceroy Lord Curzon (1899-1905) [who] made no pretense of hiding its hostility 
towards the Congress. Indeed, Curzon… stated that “one of my greatest ambitions while 
in India is to assist [the Congress] to a peaceful demise.” To achieve this end, Curzon 
decided to weaken the nationalist movement by partitioning the province of Bengal 
(1905) because according to Curzon, “Calcutta is the center from which the Congress part 
is manipulated throughout the whole of Bengal, and indeed the whole of India.” Though 
Curzon claimed that the partition was intended to bring greater efficiency to the 
administrative system, his hidden agenda was to drive a wedge between the two major 
Indian communities by separating the Muslim majority in eastern Bengal from the Hindu 
majority in the western half.69  
 
It was the blatant culmination of a half century of fixing identities and their benefits to religion 
and the prescribed gatekeepers (collaborators) of that religion. It was not so ‘hidden’ but an 
obvious and relatively successful attempt at dividing these communities and undermining the 
INC’s ability to build a truly representative coalition. “In anticipation of the partition, Curzon 
toured Bengal and tried to win Muslims support by informing his Muslim audiences that Islam 
would be dominant in the new province and invest them with a unity ‘which they had not 
enjoyed since the days of the old Mussalman Viceroys and kings.’ […] it was generally 
welcomed by the Aligarh School and many other Muslim associations of Bengal. In the long run, 
the partition did prove to have catalyzed separatist Muslims consciousness.”70  
 In the following year, 1906, the project of dividing the political futures of these now 
ostensibly homogenized communities was completed by backdoor deals and parallel political 
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Lord Minto (Viceroy, 1905-1910), and the new secretary of state for India, Viscount 
Morley, were planning to introduce reforms that would enlarge the Legislative Councils 
with “elected” Indian representatives. The Aligarh Muslims realized that the time had 
come for them to be a little more forceful in letting the government know of their fears 
and aspirations. Encouraged and advised by W. A. J. Archbold, the principle of Aligarh 
College, who had been in communication with the viceroy, a Muslim deputation was 
composed of thirty-five prominent Muslim aristocrats from various parts of India, though 
the bulk of them were from the north. Lord Minto, who had helped maneuver this 
meeting, felt that an expression of sympathy for the “hopes and aspirations” of the 
Muslim community would keep it loyal to the British and aloof from Congress; he had 
also decided that this was “a capital opportunity for making clear our position… [of] 
resolute impartiality between races and creeds [of India]” […] The viceroy agreed that 
“in any system of representation… in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an 
electoral organization, the Mahommedan community should be represented as a 
community and you justly claim that your position should be estimated not merely on 
your numerical strength but in the respect to the political importance of your community 
and the service it has rendered to the Empire… I am entirely in accord with you.” That 
evening an overjoyed British official wrote to Lady Minto congratulating the viceroy for 
“a work of statesmanship” that was “nothing less than the pulling back of sixty-two 
millions of people [Muslims] from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition [the 
Congress].” Britain had committed itself to separate Muslim electorates and laid the basis 





                                                 




Part IV: Origin and Development of Parallel Electorates 
 In the fourth part we see how the process of parallel political development becomes 
entrenched into electoral schemes. We will look at how separate electorates were granted and for 
what cause(s). Then we will see how they were implemented and how that continued to shape 
political organization. Throughout we will examine the role of expanding suffrage. Finally, we 
will look at the confluence of expanding suffrage, separate electorates, British administrative 
strategies and objectives, and the events on the path to state separation.  
 In the first section we will look at how the Muslim League formed, its demand for and 
grant of separate electorates, the emergence of Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a leader, the Morley-
Minto reforms that officially called for separate electorates as the elective principle was 
expanded, and the Lucknow Pact, an agreement between the INC and Muslim League which 
formed a unified front against colonial rule and accepted the use of separate electorates to spite 
the desires of many leaders for joint electorates including Jinnah. Separate electorates had been 
accepted as a part of the emerging political landscape.  
 In the second section we will focus on the implementation of separate electorates, 
Gandhi’s return from South Africa, the first non-cooperation campaign, and the shifting alliance 
between the Khilafatists and the INC. Then we will move to the reforms of 1919 that expanded 
the voting base from 6.5 to over 30 million, the Nehru report which called for mixed electorates, 
Jinnah’s 14 points which called for power to be centered in the province and separate electorates 
in the absence of a communal agreement, Gandhi’s second non-cooperation campaign focusing 




the all-India level, and Jinnah’s answer to Muslim factionalism at the ballot box with the demand 
for Pakistan.  
 Finally, we will look at the last decade leading up to partition during which the INC 
engaged in a mass contact campaign and the Muslim League for their part consolidated political 
power through mass appeals and provincial party incorporation. The demand for Pakistan created 
transcendent Muslim unity for the league and their election victories leading to partition as well 
as their inability to form agreement with the INC produced designs to give territoriality to the 
Pakistan demand. As boarders are drawn bloody upheaval grips the contours of the emerging 
new state and a separate Pakistan and India emerged. 
 
Granting of Separate Electorates [1906 – 1916] 
 When the emerging Indian National Congress (INC) raised the demand for 
popular elections and political representation, Muslims felt increasingly concerned, 
especially because a property qualification for the right to vote would always place them 
in a minority position on account of their poverty. Therefore, in October 1906 a 
deputation of Muslim men of property and influence…waited upon the governor-general 
Lord Minto at Simla and asked him for the reservation of seats to be chosen by separate 
Muslim electorates.72  
 
 The Muslim League was formed at the Simla deputation. The conference was called in 
order to have Muslim leaders voice their opinions on proposed constitutional reforms. These 
reforms were over electorate changes that would affect majority Muslim districts. The Simla 
deputation, as characterized by Minto, solidified “the British recognition that Muslims formed a 
distinct political community in India.”73 Minto was no bystander in this formulation. “Lady 
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Minto’s journal entry… does suggest that Minto had a number of discussions with Mohsin-ul-
Mulk prior to receiving at Simla the deputation which the latter organized…”74 Minto suggested 
the Muslims would be “of real assistance to us [the British] in dealing with much of the one-
sided agitation we have to face.”75 It is also important to note that, “…without separate 
electorates the small and scattered Muslim minority in the north could not have played such a 
leading role. It is hardly surprising to recall the special role of the United Provinces Muslim 
leaders…in formulating the original demand for separate electorates. It would appear that the 
minority status of the Muslims of the north itself gave impetus to Muslim separatist demands.”76 
They were also the most wealthy and influential Muslims in India. I am sure this in no small 
measure played into their calculus.   
 Under the distinction of a Muslim political community and its political expediency for 
the British in administering indirect rule it is easy to understand how the all-India Muslim 
League was formed in this context as they claimed to represent that constituency now politically 
recognized, and long entrenched, as separate by the British and endowed with parallel electoral 
systems reflecting that separation. In Dacca, December of 1906, the Mohammedan Educational 
Conference folded into the Muslim League which consisted of aristocratic and landed elites.77 A 
resolution was originally produced making several proclamations. Of these proclamations 
included was as usual a statement of loyalty to the British, for the promotion and protection of 
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Muslim political interests in India, and avoiding hostility towards other communities.78  
In 1907, a formal constitution was adopted by the Muslim League. The document called 
for a maximum of 400 members. The League initially was dependent financially on the support 
of likeminded princes and aristocracy. During these first years the League wielded little power 
and remained fragile and underdeveloped.79 The Indian Council Act of 1909 (Morley-Minto 
Reforms) established unofficial Indian majorities for the first time in provincial legislatures and 
indirect elections. These reforms made separate electorates a reality and reserved seats for 
Muslims in the councils.80 During the first election under the new reforms, in 1910, the League 
failed to organize as a political party with a platform.81 The lack of organizational ability and 
factionalism was apparent when in 1909 a conference of the League called in Lucknow to 
approve the government’s plan broke up in confusion.82 Again in 1911, the ineffectiveness of the 
League was demonstrated by the British reversal of the Bengal partition, which was seen as a 
harsh impingement of those interests the League was supposed to represent.83  
“The British and conservative Muslims had succeeded, as they thought,…in isolating the 
‘young Muslim’ element both from radical Congress politicians and from Muslims outside…But 
they underestimated the willingness of the ‘young Muslims’ both to seek more popular support, 
through co-operation with those who had the ear of Muslims outside the British educational 
system, namely the ulama or Muslim religious scholars and to bid for the leadership of the 
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Muslim League.”84 The ‘young Muslims’ gained the reins of control under, western educated, 
Muhammad Ali, in the 1912 conference of the League in Lucknow.85 Ali and his supporters 
“passed a resolution calling for a ‘suitable’ system of self-government for British India. Within 
six years of its foundations even an ‘upper-class’ organization as the League had passed from 
desire to be consulted by the government to a willingness to confront it.”86 Ali’s’ position was 
further consolidated, in 1913, after a riot incited by removal of a washing facility connected to a 
mosque.87 The outbreak of WWI intensified the position of the ‘young Muslims’ and ulama 
alliance. Ali wrote in the publication, Comrade (1914,) “‘all truly loyal people have closed the 
chapter of civil controversy with the officials’, but that nevertheless, if the war was really a war 
of right against might then Britain should evacuate Egypt.”88 Even after this statement the 
Muslim League passed a resolution declaring loyalty to the British, although sympathy for 
Turkey amongst the Muslim population, particularly, the lower classes, was well known to the 
British.89     
The widening belief in Pan-Islamism is directly related to the sympathy and support for 
the Caliph in Turkey. This Pam-Islamism is expressed as the alliance of the ‘young Muslims’ 
and ulama. This alliance as described by a British official, “…gives him a link with great 
traditions. It may not be an ethical ideal but it is a militant bond…at this point he comes into 
touch with the priest of the arrogant domineering type, whose ambition lies in swaying the 
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passions of the ignorant masses. Hence Pan-Islamism arises, the ideas of the Muslim ‘nation’ and 
many fantasies generated from it.”90 The electoral scheme necessitated broadly appealing 
rhetoric, broadly appealing to an electorate defined by religion. The imagining of a Muslim 
nation beyond even the boarders of Indian is completely consistent with the British imagining of 
a Muslim nation within India. It is as if the League took a page from the Raj’s playbook, political 
power securing legitimacy from religious officials.  
The British response to internal threats throughout WWI was a fierce defense of its 
control by extreme repressive measures, most prominently the India Defense Act of 1915, which 
striped many of broad civil rights.91 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, even though he was interned upon 
the outbreak of WWI, saw the League moving in his desired direction, co-operation with the INC 
to hurry constitutional and political progress on an all-Indian level. In the service of this goal, the 
two parties met and signed an agreement negotiated by Jinnah in 1916, coined the Lucknow 
Pact. This pact created a formula for future representation, accepted separate electorates for 
Muslims, and agreed upon the Muslim percentage of elected Indian membership. In Muslim 
minority provinces the percentages were 10 to 15 percent. In Muslim majority provinces, Bengal 
and Punjab, the percentage was 40 and 50.92 “The contentious part of the Lucknow Pact was its 
acceptance of separate electorates. Jinnah had always preferred joint electorates. At the annual 
Indian National Congress of 1910, he moved a resolution rejecting separate electorates for local 
bodies. But after he joined the Muslims League, having failed to persuade his colleagues to 
accept joint electorate, he acquiesced in what the party demanded. He was probably also 
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influenced by the fact that after the Morley-Minto reforms had enacted separate electorates, 
senior Congress leaders were reconciled to the idea.”93 
 
Implementation of Separate Electorates [1917 – 1927] 
 Confronted with an alliance of the Indian parties, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, 
Edwin Montagu, pronounced British plans for institutions that would be self-governing and 
eventually lead to Indian ‘responsible government.’94 Repudiating the old model of British rule, 
“India would instead follow the path already chalked out by the white-setters dominions of 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Inevitably, too, it meant that, rather than disdaining the 
educated as an unrepresentative minority, the British would repose in them the confidence due 
future leaders of India. These men were, Montagu averred, in a telling comment on the 
declaration, ‘intellectually our children’, who had ‘imbibed ideas which we ourselves set before 
them’. Britain, however, retained the right to set the pace of the reform, which was to be slow 
and measured, a boon, as the British saw it, to be conferred upon the Indians as they qualified for 
its benefits.”95 The British developed a diarchy which split the functions of government in two.  
In provinces responsibility for raising necessary taxes, agriculture, and education were 
placed upon Indian ministers answering to local bodies. The central government was clearly still 
under British control and they preserved ‘reserved’ subjects such as law and order.96 The 
Rowlatt Acts and other repressive mechanisms that were in place from WWI were used to coerce 
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Indians as the phantom of revolutionary terrorism and economic dislocation impelled the British 
in their designs. These measures invoked extreme resentment towards the British as the common 
Indian sentiment of these measures was a bitter compensation for Indian sacrifice during WWI. 
In response new methods of protest were developed and spread, resulting in martial law in 
several areas and the well-remembered massacre at Amritsar of peaceful demonstrators, which 
became a rally for anti-colonialism.97         
   
These events were stimulated by Gandhi’s return from South Africa, his use of ‘passive 
resistance,’ and cooperation by the Indian parties against the British. After the end of WWI the 
Ottoman Empire was divided up, Arab holy lands now laid in the hands of European puppets and 
the fear of the caliph being displaced enraged a diverse array of Muslims. As a direct result in 
1919 the All-India Khilafat committee was established.98 Their members mostly consisted of 
ulama, conservative Muslims, and ‘young Muslims.’ They were largely Muslim Leaguers.99 
Gandhi negotiated an alliance between the newly emerged Khilafat Conference and Indian 
National Congress, however, the Khilafat movement, ‘…with its distinct organization and 
symbolic repertoire, helped define the emerging identity of ‘Indian Muslims.’”100From 1920 
until 1922 Gandhi lead a massive movement with his alliance of non-cooperation. It ended after 
it turned violent and Gandhi himself called it off. The alliance also created one crucial defection 
from the INC, Jinnah the future leader of the Muslim League. He defected because of 
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disagreements with what Gandhi was leading, an “unseemly mass movement” as Jinnah 
described it.101     
The reforms agreed to in the Lucknow Pact were institutionalized under the Government 
of India Act of 1919. “These reforms greatly reinforced and extended the communal base to 
Indian politics. They institutionalized the principles of separate electorates for Hindus and 
Muslims…one of the most crucial factors in the development of communal politics. Muslims 
politicians did not have to appeal to non-Muslims; non-Muslims did not have to appeal to 
Muslim. This made it very difficult for a genuine Indian nationalism to emerge.”102 These 
reforms expanded the franchise from one to over five million voters, which increased to a large 
extent the participation of rural voters in the electorate.103 “The manner in which the reforms… 
shaped political life tended to sharpen communal awareness and antagonism… individual 
constituencies were small enough to give politics a personal flavour.”104 “Communal 
antagonisms between classes of Hindus and Muslims in those provinces where the reforms of 
1919 had been introduced growled incessantly throughout the nineteen-twenties.”105 The 
Khilafat-Congress alliance broke down. “The organization of parallel, yet separate, processions 
and meetings by the Congress and by the Khilafatists only intensified, and also institutionalized, 
this distinction between communities…In 1924 the new secular Turkish regime of Ataturk itself 
abolished the Khilafat. Bereft of this shared grievance, their separate political ambitions 
heightened by the promise of power held out under…reforms, Hindu and Muslim leaders turned 
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instead increasingly to mobilizing followers by the use of each religions distinctive symbols. The 
result was an explosive era of rioting and recrimination.”106 “At the street level, there were 
serious communal riots at Multan…Panipat…Rewari...Lahore...a number of Hindu-Muslim 
disorders occurred.”107 
The significance of separate electorates lay in the fact that they offered a structural 
definition of Muslim community far different from that emerging from reformist or 
devotional politics. In contrast to the shifting ambiguities found in public debates about 
the meaning of Muslim community, separate electorates rested on a flat, homogenous 
definition of Muslim community in which descent was primary – a definition drawn from 
the British Indian census. Separate electorate thus provided a bureaucratically fixed frame 
for Muslim community definition that had little reference to ongoing public debates 
relating to reformed behavior or to matters of the heart. At the same time, however, 
separate electorates subsumed the competitive structure of the electoral process itself, 
where rival Muslim candidates mobilized their opposing networks of personal, kin, and 
class-based support in sometimes biter competition. Separate electorates thus embodied, 
simultaneously, the image of a common Muslim community, fixed by state definition, 
and the reality of deep provincial and local divisions. What separate electorates did not 
do, of course, with their roots in flat, census definitions, was to define a moral language 
of Muslim unity. It was no accident, in this context, that the Muslim votes in the 1920’s 
and 1930’s was on practice highly fragmented, focused on localized influence.108  
 
British Imposition, Indian Response, & Parallel Political Structures [1927 – 1937] 
 The British concerned with the obvious failures of the reforms of 1919 and the 
antagonism that they enflamed appointed a commission, headed by Sir John Simon, to advise on 
further reforms to India’s’ constitution. The commission was comprised strictly of members of 
British parliament. The existence of this commission implied that Indians were incapable of 
deciding their future and this implication was enough to facilitate the emergence of a second 
                                                 
106 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, 179 
107 Hardy, The Muslims of British India, 203 




campaign of non-cooperation.109 “The Muslim League split on whether the statutory (Simon) 
Commission should be boycotted…one faction lead by Jinnah, decided to join Congress in 
boycotting the Commission.”110 During the next few years several plans were discussed and the 
Muslim League became increasingly factionalized over the proposals. The Nehru Report 
“recommended joint mixed electorates, with reservation of seats for Muslims in the Muslim 
minority provinces, but no such reservation in the majority Muslim provinces…”111 The Nehru 
report also recommended the abolition of separate electorates.112 Conferences were called to 
discuss the report. However Jinnah felt frustrated that little was being advanced in favor of his 
ideals and in 1929 released his ‘Fourteen Points’ on behalf of the All-Parties Muslim 
Conference. It called for residual powers to rest with the provinces, maintenance of separate 
electorates in absence of communal agreements, 1/3 of the seats in the central legislature, and 
other protections of a separate Muslim identity.113 The failure of the Indian parties to cooperate 
in a constitutional reform process left the British in a position to mediate as they saw fit.114 In 
1930 the Simon Commission recommended the grant of provincial autonomy, adding that a 
responsible government at the center was unlikely to form. A Round Table Conference was 
called, but members of the INC were not represented, non-cooperation had begun again. Gandhi 
began the campaign by marching to the ocean and making salt. Salt at the time was not a major 
source of revenue for the government. However, the denial of access soon became a rallying 
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point for Indian nationalists and drew attention from around the globe. The Great Depression 
was also a factor in the outrage and disobedience movement that quickly spread throughout 
India. This second non-cooperation campaign was more inclusive enjoying widespread support. 
Gandhi, in the midst of a brief truce attended the second round of these negotiations but 
came home with little accomplished and the INC, who denounced Gandhi as a ‘sell out’ was 
immediately repressed in the wake of Gandhi’s return, as they were seen increasingly as a threat. 
Most leaders were imprisoned for two years after which the non-cooperation ended.115 In 1932, 
there was a ‘Communal Award’ that sought to give special treatment to minorities, including 
separate electorates.  To the British this was ideal. “This meant that Congress politicians should 
be diverted to and then kept bottled up in the provinces, while the central government, with 
power shared among Muslims, princes, and other groups such as Sikhs and untouchables, would 
be in the hands of those who could be relied upon to secure Britain’s interests.”116 Following the 
doctrine of the Communal Award, the Government of India Act of 1935, “meant to set in place a 
framework for the Conservative vision of India, it made provision for a federal centre and, doing 
away with diarchy, substantially extended provisional autonomy, with ministers responsible to 
their local legislatures now in charge of all branches of government.”117  
In this context, “During the 1920s and 1930s separate electorates were strongly 
condemned by the Indian national movement as a colonial device meant to subvert the anti-
imperialist struggle. In spite of all Congress protestations….communal representation was 
accepted as a regular feature and ran right through the Constitution, both in legislatures and in 
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the public services. Separate electorates for Muslims…were maintain and extended.”118 Again, 
the British are completely consistent in extending the religious based political identity they 
created which allowed them to act as the arbitrator and continue to administer indirect rule 
effectively. “The main advance over the reforms of 1919 was the granting of full provincial 
autonomy, which meant that for the first time Indian politicians had the opportunity of winning 
real power at the provincial level. The electorate was expanded from 6.5 to 30 million voters, 
which meant that a tenth of the population or nearly a sixth of the adult population became 
enfranchised.”119 Nehru summarized the point well considering the, “process of divergence 
between the religious communities… aggravated by official policy symbolized by the 
establishment of separate electorates; and as the franchise was broadened periodically on this 
basis, the communal elements grew correspondingly stronger... pandering to myth and passion in 
their attempts to secure a base among the people.”120  
Elections under the new Act cemented the position of the Congress as a mass movement. 
However, when in office the Congress did not hold up to many of its promises and rather towed 
the line of the British government as they had expected.121 The Muslim League in contrast 
waned as a political party in the 1930’s. The idea of Pakistan had been discussed in the early 
1930’s and Jinnah’s fourteen points described a road map to that end.122 However, the election in 
1937 showed that the League did not really represent the Muslims of India. Provincially many of 
the seats had been won by local parties and not the League. “Jinnah…posed the alternative of 
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Muslims organizing themselves effectively as an all-India force for the first elections… under 
the 1935 Act. Jinnah returned to India in 1935 (From England,) to try to bind the moribund 
Muslim political splinter-groups. Only if the Muslims had a powerful all-India organization, with 
mass Muslim electoral support, could they influence the future constructively.”123 Jinnah tried to 
develop a Central Parliamentary Board within the constructs of the Muslim League, but it was 
too little avail. The results of the elections sharpened differences between the INC and the 
League as the League under Jinnah orchestrated parallel structures to the INC. Jinnah attempted 
to make distinctions between the two groups by condemning those who freely fluctuated 
between the two, as he had earlier. Nehru as well tried to co-opt Muslim Leaguers under strict 
conditions that affectively resigned their political autonomy to Congress.124  
…in his [Jinnah] address to the October 1937 session of the Muslim League in Lucknow 
[he said]: No settlement with [the] majority community is possible as no Hindu leader 
speaking with any authority shows any concern or any genuine desire for it. Honourable 
settlement can only be achieved between equals and unless the two parties learn to 
respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for settlement. Offers of peace by the 
weaker party always mean confession of weakness and invitation to aggression. Politics 
means power and not relying only on cries of justice or fair play or goodwill.125  
 
“The British introduction of separate electorates guaranteed that colonial elections fit into their 
overarching framework of community manipulation… elections offered also a new, important 
public venue for disputation that drew in those already involved in other forms of public debate 
about the self-definition of Islamic community. This led to the increasing politicization of the 
rhetoric of Muslim community about self-definition and… significant popular debate over the 
meaning of Muslim identity in a public and political arena attached directly to the structure of the 
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state.”126 When in 1937 the Muslim League failed to win power either through elections or 
provincial negotiations the League, “decided to reorganize, mobilize the Muslim electorate, and 
change the terms of political competition by raising the Pakistan demand.”127 
 
Deepening Divisions & Partition [1937 – 1947] 
In the decade leading to partition growing divisions between the League and the 
Congress were exasperated. After the Lucknow sessions League membership grew as Jinnah 
expanded their base and attempted to form a grass roots organization parallel to that of the INC 
as the Congress sought to reach out to Muslims in the ‘mass contact’ campaign.128 The ‘mass 
contact’ campaign antagonized further the Muslim League inciting anti-Congress tirades,  
…which propagated the alarmist imagery of a Hindu Raj… the failure of power-
sharing arrangements… demonstrated to Jinnah in a stark manner the futility of politics 
built upon separate electorates. Jinnah realized that, while separate electorates provided 
incentive to communal politics, they prevented further advance into formal structures of 
power, which required a majority status…even if the League had won all the minority 
seats it would still had to remain in opposition or at best lay a subordinate role to the 
party in power… Jinnah… proceeded to build alternative all-India political structures of 
the Muslims… seeking parity with the other all-India structures.129   
  
“By the outbreak of war in 1939 the Muslim League stood forth as the strongest single 
Muslim political organization in the Muslim minority provinces.”130 This greatly increased the 
position of the Muslim League because the British sought support from the League both as a 
counterweight to the INC and because of the heavy reliance on Muslim areas, like the Punjab, for 
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soldiers in the war effort.131 In 1939 the Viceroy met with Jinnah and representatives of the INC. 
This meeting “stipulated that any expansion of the Viceroy’s executive council to include more 
representative Indians and any return to popular government in the provinces was conditional 
upon Congress and the Muslim League reaching further agreement. Jinnah had been presented 
with a veto upon further constitutional advance…”132 On March 23rd of 1940, the all-India 
Muslim League passed the ‘Pakistan resolution.’ Based upon the conclusion that, “No 
constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is 
designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are 
demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments that 
may be necessary, that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority should be 
grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units should be autonomous 
and sovereign.”133 The colonially produced religious based political identities, were given shape 
by the British, embedded in electoral institutions, and inculcated in the actors, leading to a 
territorial articulation of the schema. 
Indeed, the structural framework offered by separate electorates provides us a critical 
backdrop for understanding the Muslim Leagues adoption… of the demand for Pakistan. 
It was in response both to the electoral success of the Congress in 1937 and to the 
growing sense of fragmentation among Muslims themselves that the Muslim League 
linked its identity to the demand for a separate state as a symbol of the community’s 
moral unity; tension between an image of moral unity and the competitive structuring of 
politics of course long shaped Muslim rhetoric within the public realm. But now the 
League sought to frame this realm of competition with a fixed image of unity – an image 
tied at once to census definitions and to the moral authority associated with the image of 
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a Muslim state. It was this that drove the League’s attachment not only to the idea of 
Pakistan, but also to the vision of Jinnah as sole spokesman.134  
 
All of this as the British had originally imagined identity in India, as fixed and primarily 
defined by religion. Although once in separate electorates the differences within the Muslim 
community became apparent electorally, the unifying feature was to imagine a physical 
boundary for Muslims as the conceptual boundary had been reinforced through every institution 
and reform since 1857. The British stated that no transfer of power over Indian affairs would 
take place with a party whose authority was denied by a large segment of Indians. Essentially, 
leaving the option of Pakistan on the table as the British would not oppose it with the Congress.  
In 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps, a British official on a mission to India, effectively gave 
permission for Jinnah to win mass support for a Pakistan movement and partition. In 1942, the 
Madras legislature of the INC recommended acceptance of partition demands and a series of 
meetings took place in which Gandhi agreed to autonomous regions. However concerted efforts 
to destroy League power, in the form of rebellion and the ‘Quit India’ campaign were exercised 
by the INC.135 Over the next few years the League consolidated its power in the majority Muslim 
provinces and gave real support for the idea of Pakistan. Provincial parties were incorporated 
into the League as well as other politicians. An economic plan for the proposed Pakistan was 
developed in 1943 at a session of the League in Karachi.136      
 In 1945 a conference was called by the British in Simla that would establish an interim 
government. However, the negotiations collapsed when Jinnah insisted upon representation of all 
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Muslims.137 Elections in the winter of 1945-1946 showed that Jinnah and the League did indeed 
garnish the support of the Muslim majority as the results of the election left the political 
landscape with two bitterly divided parties. The league swept the seats reserved for Muslims. 
The election was solely fought by the League on the issue of Pakistan.138 “It was no accident that 
elections played a critical role in Jinnah’s efforts to substantiate this vision, for it was through the 
structure of elections that Jinnah appealed for local support while maintaining a symbolic vision 
of transcendent unity… Had they not done so, it is unlikely that they could have swept the 
majority of the Muslim seats and defeated powerful regional parties…”139  
Muslim League rhetoric thus helped to create an image of Pakistan as the antithesis of 
that power (colonial), as the embodiment of a community that transcended politics – 
indeed, that was defined in opposition to the noise and confusion of divisions. Separate 
electorates in fact fostered this appeal. The structure of the electoral arena defined the 
tension between the image of a fixed, objectively defined Muslim community (defined by 
separate electorates), and the reality of electoral conflict among Muslims themselves. The 
image of unity to which the Muslim League appealed – and which justified its claim to 
Pakistan – fed off this tension and thus drew, in an important sense, on the very structure 
of the colonial electoral arena itself.140  
     
Following the election there were, “bloody upheavals of 1946 and 1947 Pakistan 
underwent a transformation from visionary ideal to territorial state.”141 In March of 1946 the 
British devised a plan of their own for an independent India that would consist of a three tiered 
federation, whose central feature was the creation of groups of provinces of which Pakistan 
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would be one. The League essentially accepted this proposal.142 The Congress rejected this 
arrangement. Nehru said, “Provinces must be free to join any group, or none.”143 The stalemate 
left little choice but to partition the two emerging states. Chaos ripped the country and the British 
eager to leave moved the date for a handover of power from 1948 up to August of 1947. In 
August the INC and the Muslim League asserted power over partitioned India.144 The League 
seizing power over ‘Pakistan’ and the INC over greater India, and the disputes no longer could 
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I have argued that the system of categorizing those who were under British colonial rule 
manufactured a particular set of political identities on the Indian subcontinent and as a result two 
states emerged out of one. This raised several questions: How did institutional arrangements 
contribute to political identity formation? What material cause motivated these formations? How 
did political identities become polarized? As we followed the historical analysis there are some 
conclusions we can begin to draw. Let’s parse this out! 
 How did institutional arrangements contribute to political identity formation? 
Institutional arrangements contributed to political identity formation by using an imperial 
conception of identity to administer the state apparatus creating a pattern of day-to-day behavior 
that over time became distinct and separate as subjects interacted with the state and each other. 
This was done as part of the administrative strategy of indirect rule that allotted awards on a 
communal basis and made the British the intermediary between as they saw it their ‘children.’ 
The categorization of these groups in law, education, society, and most obviously in the census 
reinforced a particular identity that served imperial objectives. This process was finalized with 
the implementation of these categories into political identities acting through separate 
electorates. If there was any doubt in the mind of a subject to what their primary identity was the 
electoral division put it in sharp display. 
 What material causes motivated these formations? To the British, these formations were 
largely a function of administrative ease and of maintaining the necessity of their domination in 
order to continue the economic benefits associated. If they fostered two opposing groups they 




extraction of the subcontinent. To the elite religious figures this system gave them more 
authority as the British relied on them as the arbitrator of authentic religion and cultivated those 
allies that presented themselves as suitable collaborators with rewards. This was true for both 
Hindu and Muslim religious elites. To the Westernized elites, often the aristocratic and wealth 
producing classes they also sought to maintain their power and economic productivity. To the 
masses, they sought anything better and were willing to follow those that could provide 
resources and rewards, either in the form of religious or economic systems of patronage. This 
arrangement simply evolved into the formal political system as elections began and 
enfranchisement spread these power brokers became office holders.       
 How did political identities become polarized? Through the use of increasingly heated 
rhetoric as politicians sought to maximize votes in separate religious based electorates. If one can 
only vote for a member of one’s religion that religion is the lowest common denominator in the 
electorate, it logically follows that religion will be the biggest vote getter so that is where 
rhetoric centers upon. This is also coupled with an institutional separation delineated by religion 
that impacted the day-to-day interactions with the state and its governing apparatus which 
created distinct and separate patterns of behavior between colonially defined communities. 
Things that are separate will never be perceived as equal and this also lent credence to the 
rhetoric, becoming self-reinforcing. 
 Keeping these questions in mind, the overall trajectory of events by my recounting is 
summarized as follows. The demand for separate electorates by Muslims to maintain their power 
in a majority Hindu government and the granting of this request by the British, as a 




developments at the all-India level of these now electorally defined, through this award, two 
communities. It was the culmination of more than a century of divide-and-rule policies mixed 
with Orientalists notions of homogenized communities primarily based on religion that fixed, 
previously highly local and fluid, identities in the sub-continent. The fixing of these identities 
around this flat homogenous classification and the rewards for those who operated within it 
created a system of indirect rule that was dependent on these communal definitions and 
antagonistic to any mingling between them, primarily represented by the INC. The League 
presented itself in this paradigm and received benefits and British support as a result.  
The path towards two states was born out of the British conceptualization and 
institutional recognition of a separate Muslim community and primarily the creation of Muslim 
as a political category and identity. Originally a collection of elite land owners and aristocracy, 
the League under Jinnah’s leadership was turned into a party representative of the Muslim 
majority and garnishing wide based support by 1947 by mimicking the British in their imagining 
of that identity, he simply added physical borders around the conception. An organization of 
Muslim elites was transformed into a grass roots movement and then a separate state. 
The constant reinforcement of separate political identities in the wake of the 1857 
rebellion was finalized through the implementation of separate electorates that made the partition 
inevitable as competing groups began to see their interests only represented by ‘their’ party. As 
the voting base increased so did the need to reinforce unity around homogenous imagery, 
compounded by the consolidation of Muslims into the League and for Muslim political control to 
be in the hands of the League only, articulated through the demand for Pakistan and the 




the violence that ensued during the process was a direct result of indirect rule based on defined 
and fixed categories forming distinct political identities. 
 Demands for Pakistan began to emerge in the early 1930s as plans for constitutional 
reforms put forth both by Jinnah and Nehru, in response to the Simon Commission. Separate 
electorates were insured by the Government of India act in 1935 and Jinnah began building 
parallel structures to the INC. He consolidated the beginnings of political Muslim solidarity and 
all-India level advancements of the Muslim League. The election of 1937 that showed the 
League had little support, while the INC solidified their position, accelerated the efforts of Jinnah 
in building a grass roots organization that would represent the greater Muslim community as 
defined institutionally through separate electorates. The League gained immense ground and 
became the main player with the INC in deciding India’s constitutional fate. The British seeking 
to counterbalance the INC with the League endowed Jinnah with vast power in the process of 
constitutional reform, reaping the rewards of a century of Muslim efforts to present themselves 
as the traditional homogenous community the British imagined them to be. Divisions quickly 
became cavernous and the rift became unstoppable, as the League won overwhelming victories 
in the election of 1946 on the platform of Pakistan. The inability of the two parties to come to 
terms in an Indian federation made cleavages in India burst at the seams. When India was handed 
over by the British the result would be a declaration of two states.  
The character of the two parties, based in increasingly heated rhetoric, centered on the 
Muslim-Hindu divide which over decades was institutionalized in the form of separate 
electorates. The British for their part designed to divide-and-rule by manufacturing distinct 




India’s political-social development and the two future states, it was the strategy of indirect rule 
and the associated divisions implemented in that service. 
 Separate electorates were originally awarded at the request of elite Muslim to safeguard 
their positions and to the British delight as a counterbalance to the INC.  The conditions of 
colonialism – the British policy of indirect rule/divide-and-rule and elite minority’s fear of losing 
their prominent positions initially fostered the award of separate electorates, but as parties and 
candidates sought to maximize their electoral vote’s partition became the most likely outcome.  
 Overall the use and implementation of separate electorates based on colonially 
manufactured political identities established that in order to maximize electoral results an all-
India Muslim appeal needed to be made to an imagined unified community, in reality the Muslim 
community was quite politically fractured. The parallel development of Muslim League 
structures to that of the INC operationalized this competitive imperative. The rhetoric espoused 
by the British and elites over decades entrenched the colonial political identity and enabled 
partition to be a viable solution to a government of two “communities.” If only a Muslim can 
represent a Muslim than options for government become narrow and partition is an 
understandable development. “No electoral system should force electors and the elected into pre-
determined identities – which is precisely what separate electorates do.”145 The partition of India 
and the creation of Pakistan was most directly a result of the institutionalization of colonially 
manufactured political identities following the upheaval of 1857 which culminated in the 
implantation of separate electorates after which it was a matter of path determinacy.   
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